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Mechanism design studies optimization problems with inputs from selfishly behaving
agents. To a class of relatively simple questions, classical auction theory gives optimal
solution which are often too complicated for practical use. This dissertation presents
techniques and results on the design and analysis of simple and practical auctions that
have provably approximately optimal performances. For single-parameter revenue op-
timization, we present the k-lookahead auction, which works for coorelated valuation
distributions, and we discuss its consequences, which encompass a family of reserve-
price-based auctions with approximately optimal revenue. For more general settings, we
present the marginal revenue mechanisms as a framework for designing simple mech-
anisms in very general settings. Both frameworks are motivated with clear economic
intuitions.
For social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions, we present an equilib-
rium analysis for simultaneous item auctions. In particular, we show that when val-
uations exhibit no complements, the welfare loss in these auctions at Bayesian Nash
equilibria is bounded by small constants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design studies optimization systems that take into account participants’
private information and selfish behaviors. The past ten years have seen a fruitful mar-
riage of this subfield of microeconomics with computer science, accelerated by the ad-
vent of the Internet and the ensuing business on it, such as display ad auctions run by
search engine companies and large scale, dynamic auctions run by websites like Price-
line or eBay. Algorithmic ideas and tools have been brought to bear on decades-old
problems of economic theory, yielding new economic insights in addition to potential
impacts on industries.
This thesis focuses on two aspects of this development. First, economic characteri-
zations of optimal mechanisms beyond classic scenarios tend to be too complex for prac-
tical use. A theme of the chapters to follow to that, when the viewpoint of approximation
is adopted, much more structure and insights can be revealed and applied. Second, and
relatedly, the use of mechanisms in practice often favors simplicity over theoretical op-
timality, when the two design goals come into conflict. Simplicity here may refer to
systems having succinct specifications, requiring less self-deliberation and private in-
formation disclosure by market participants, tolerating the lack of certain information
on the mechanism implementer’s part, and so on. This thesis presents research progress
showing, on one hand, that the structure gained from adopting approximations often
guides the design of simple mechanisms, and on the other hand, that mechanisms used
in practice can often be analyzed and evaluated as approximations to optimal bench-
marks.
Background. A mechanism involves the participation of strategic agents with private
information. The agents’ information, summarized as types, is unknown to us, while
a decision on a social outcome needs to be made from interactions with them. In an
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auction, for example, a bidder’s type may describe her valuations of the items being
sold, and the social outcome is a decision to sell which items to which bidders at what
prices. The mechanism designer devises rules of interaction and decision, so that certain
goals, usually functions of the agents’ types, can be optimized, while taking heed that
the agents may behave strategically—their interests, expressed in utilities, are typically
affected by the social outcome. A bedrock solution concept in mechanism design is in-
centive compatibility in direct revelation mechanisms. In a direct revelation mechanism,
each agent reports her type to the mechanism; the mechanism is said to be incentive
compatible if all agents of all types find it in their best interests to reveal information
honestly. On this solution concept stand two Nobel-prize-winning works. One is the
Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [18, 28, 54], a general procedure maximizing
the social welfare (the sum of all participants’ utilities). The other is Myerson’s auc-
tion that optimizes the seller’s expected revenue [43]. These two mechanisms bolster a
large part of the study of mechanism design, but beyond very simple settings they either
cannot be generalized or have too complex (economically or computationally or both)
generalizations to be practical. A recurring theme of this thesis is to restore simplicity
to these scenarios by way of adopting a viewpoint of approximations.
1.1 (Approximately) Optimal Auctions Beyond Myerson.
The optimal auction by Myerson maximizes the seller’s expected revenue for bidders
with linear utilities and independently drawn valuations. (An agent is said to have lin-
ear utility if her utility is equal to her value of the service or items she gets minus the
payment she makes.) Notwithstanding its elegance, Myerson’s auction has several limi-
tations. First, unlike auctions commonly run in practice, where the outcome is typically
transparently decided by comparisons among the bidders’ bids above reserve prices,
Myerson’s auction is relatively complicated. One manifestation of this complexity is
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that a bidder with a lower bid can at times win over higher bidders. Second, when bid-
ders’ valuations are correlated, its revenue can be far from optimal [43]. Third, Myer-
son’s optimal auction does not generalize to settings where bidders have multi-parameter
types or non-linear utilities.
In Chapter 3 we investigate the first two limitations. A formally simple solution
to the correlated distribution cases turns out to be instrumental with developing sim-
ple approximations in the independent value case. We start with the following simple
k-lookahead auction, generalizing the lookahead auction proposed by Ronen [48]: con-
ditioning on lower bids, run the optimal auction on the highest k bidders. We show
the revenue of this auction to be at least 2k−13k−1 of the optimal revenue extractable if we
require that a truthful bidder never ends up with a negative utility. This result quan-
tifies the importance of high bidders in terms of approximations. Lookahead auctions
were originally developed for correlated valuations, but their analysis sheds light on
reserve-price-based practical auctions under independent valuations. In the second part
of Chapter 3, we present several such auctions with approximately optimal performance
that are simpler than the optimal auctions in various aspects. We note that the latter
results were known prior to this work and were the content of several papers [4, 21, 32],
but the perspective of lookahead auctions allow great simplification of their analysis and
allow us to present all of them rather compactly.
Myerson’s requirement for single-parameter types and linear utilities significantly
restricts the auction’s applicability. For example, multi-item auctions generally require
more than one parameter to describe bidders’ valuations, and bidders that have bud-
gets or are averse to risks cannot be modeled with linear utilities. Recently, a generic
polynomial-time reduction was discovered [1, 11, 12, 13] from the problem of multi-
agent optimal mechanism design to that of single-agent mechanism design. These algo-
rithms are based on convex programming techniques, and produce complex procedures
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that are neither practical to run nor conducive to economic intuition. In Chapter 4,
we present a framework for searching and analyzing simple and near-optimal mecha-
nisms in these general environments. In a classical paper [9], Bulow and Roberts gave
a simple interpretation of Myerson’s optimal auction: if we see each bidder as a market
wherein the makeup of customers is specified by the distribution of the bidder’s types,
then a monopoly price setter observes a shrinking fraction of buying customers as the
price rises. When optimizing revenue with a limited supply over multiple markets, the
monopolizer rations the supply across the markets by maximizing the sum of marginal
revenues. Myerson’s optimal auction turns out to be the same procedure, by mapping
each type to the marginal revenue corresponding to that customer’s critical buying price.
This simple economics does not generalize to more complex settings, because there is
no obvious mapping from a type to a marginal revenue, and because the mechanism de-
signer has more freedom than simply setting prices in markets.1 We develop techniques
to connect both broken links, first by giving substance to marginal revenue maximization
in general contexts, and second by showing that the procedure achieves approximately
optimal revenue. Such mechanisms provide new insights on the economic structure of
optimal mechanisms beyond Myerson’s setting and have broad potential applications.
One example we give is a simple, near-optimal auction for budgeted bidders in very
general environments.
1.2 Towards More Realistic Mechanisms
Mechanisms used in reality are often not direct revelation incentive compatible but are
simple procedures in which agents have room for strategic behaviors. Such mechanisms
are popular for various reasons. For example, the communication between participants
1Such freedom happens not to render additional power in the single-parameter, linear utility case,
which is the key to the relative straightforwardness of the analysis for these cases.
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in such auctions can be significantly less than a full description of their types. The Gen-
eralized Second Price Auctions (GSP) run by search engines and the auctions on eBay
are examples of such non-incentive-compatible auctions. As these auctions are often
designed based on heuristics, it is of both theoretical and practical interest to analyze
their performance at equilibrium reached by strategic participants.
As an example, we consider combinatorial auctions: m items are sold to n bidders,
where each bidder has a valuation for every possible subset of items, and we would like
to maximize the social welfare. A salient example of this is the auction held by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that sells spectrum to wireless communi-
cation companies. Instead of eliciting combinatorial preferences from participants, it is
much more practical to simultaneously run first- or second-price auctions on the items
separately. (In fact, such auctions are often used in practice; the auctions on eBay can be
seen as an example after reasonable simplification.) Such simultaneous auctions form
games where truthfully bidding one’s valuation on each item can be a very poor strat-
egy, and (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium is an appropriate concept with which to predict
and evaluate the auctions’ outcome. In Chapter 5 we show that, for simultaneous first-
price (and second-price) auctions with complement-free valuations, the social welfare at
any Bayesian Nash equilibrium is at least a half (and a quarter) of the optimal allocation.
1.3 Bibliographic Notes
The material in Section 3.2 is from joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Bobby Klein-
berg which appeared in [22], and the other parts of Chapter 3 are based on [26]. Chap-
ter 4 is based on joint work with Saeed Alaei, Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline
which will appear in [2]. Chapter 5 is based on joint work with Michal Feldman, Nick
Gravin and Brendan Lucier, which appeared in [25].
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In this chapter we give basic definitions in mechanism design, introduce notations to
be used throughout the rest of the thesis, and review a few classical results.
Single-Dimensional Mechanism Design For most of the thesis we will consider
single-dimensional mechanism design problems. In Section 4.3 and Chapter 5 we
will consider multi-dimensional settings. Notations and backgrounds will be provided
therein.
In a single-dimensional auction environment, an auctioneer provides a service to a
set N of n bidders, but with certain constraints on which subsets of bidders he could
simultaneously serve. Formally, if we use [n] to denote the set of bidders, then there is
a set I ⊆ 2[n], such that the auctioneer can serve a subset S of bidders simultaneously if
and only if S is in I. For example, in a single item auction, I consists of all singleton
subsets of [n]. When I forms a matroid on [n], we call the environment a matroid
setting. Matroid settings encompass important types of markets, e.g. digital goods (when
all subsets are feasible, i.e., I = 2[n]), k unit auctions (when I contains all subsets of size
at most k, i.e., is the k-uniform matroid), and unit-demand bipartite matching markets
(when I is a traversal matroid). We say the environment is downward closed if T ∈ I
implies S ∈ I, ∀S ⊆ T .
Valuations and Their Distributions Each bidder i has a private valuation vi for being
served. We will assume that vi is drawn from a distribution whose cumulative distri-
bution function is Fi, i.e., Fi(v) = Pr[vi ≤ v]. The corresponding density function is
denoted as fi. When the valuations of different bidders are independent random vari-
ables, we say they are independent bidders; otherwise they are correlated. The joint
distribution of all bidders’ values is denoted by F. Except for the part on the revenue
guarantee of lookahead auctions (Section 3.2 and relavant theorems in Section 3.3) , we
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focus on auctions with independent bidders in this thesis. When all bidders’ valuations
are identically independently distributed (i.i.d.), we say they are symmetric; otherwise
they are asymmetric. A standard shortened notation for (v1, . . . , vi−1, v′i , vi+1, . . . , vn) is
(v′i , v−i).
Auctions and Incentive Compatibility An auction is a pair of vector functions (x, p)
defined on tuples of valutions. At the valuations (v1, . . . , vn), the allocation func-
tion, xi(v1, . . . , vn), gives the probability with which bidder i receives the service, and
pi(v1, . . . , vn) , the payment function, denotes the expected payment bidder i makes to
the auctioneer. Bidder i is said to have linear utility, or, equivalently, risk averse, if
his utility in participating the auction (x, p), given the other bidders’ valuations v−i, is
vixi(vi, v−i)−pi(vi, v−i). We will consider risk neutral bidders throughout the thesis except
in Section 4.3.
Since bidders’ valuations are private and their utility is affected by the auction out-
come, which in turn depends on the bidders’ behaviors, the bidders may misreport their
valuations to gain advantage. In order to incentivize truthful behavior, we study auctions
that are incentive compatible. An auction is called dominant strategy incentive compati-
ble (DSIC) or, equivalently, ex post incentive compatible, if, for all (v1, . . . , vn), all i and
all v′i ,
vixi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vix(v′i , v−i) − pi(v′i , v−i).
An auction is called Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if, for all i, vi and v′i ,
Ev−i∼F−i | vi
[
vixi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i | vi [vixi(v′i , v−i) − pi(v′i , v−i)] ,
where F−i | vi is the conditional distribution of v−i given vi. When the bidders are inde-
pendent, this is just
∏
j,i F j.
An auction is said to be ex post individually rational (ex post IR) if, for all (v1, . . . , vn)
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and all i,
vixi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i) ≥ 0.
Similarly to the definition of BIC, we say that a mechanism is interim individually ra-
tional (interim IR), if for all i and vi,
Ev−i∼F−i | vi
[
vixi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ 0.
In this thesis we will focus on incentive compatible auctions in Chapter 3 and Chap-
ter 4, where we will use the terms bids and valuations interchangeably. In Chapter 5 we
will consider two auctions that are not incentive compatible.
The social welfare for serving a set S of bidders is
∑
i∈S vi. The expected revenue
made by an auction is E(v1,...,vn)∼F[
∑
i pi(v1, . . . , vn)].
Characterization of BIC Mechanisms and Optimal Auctions In a seminal work,
Myerson [43] gives a characterization of all BIC mechanisms in single-dimensional
environments with risk-neutral bidders, and also derives the revenue-optimal auction.
These results are summarized in the following theorem, where part 4 is a corollary on
single-item auctions by applying the other parts:
Theorem 2.0.1 (43). For risk-neutral bidders with valuations drawn independently and
identically from F,
1. (monotonicity) The allocation rule x(v) for each agent is monotone non-
decreasing in v.
2. (payment identity) The payment rule satisfies p(v) = vx(v) − ∫ v
0
x(z)dz.
3. (virtual value) The ex ante expected payment of an agent is Ev[p(v)] =
Ev[ϕ(v)x(v)] where ϕ(v) = v − 1−F(v)f (v) is the virtual value for value v.
4. (optimality) In a single-item auction, when the distribution F is regular, i.e., ϕ(v)
is monotone, the second-price auction with reserve ϕ−1(0) is revenue-optimal.
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Revenue Curves and Monopoly Reserves One way to interpret Myerson [43]’s char-
acterization is by way of revenue curves. We will repeated make use of this; in fact,
Chapter 4 is virtually devoted to a reinterpretation and generalization of this important
perspective.
Consider selling to a single bidder i by setting a take-it-or-leave-it price. For each
price p, the probability that the bidder takes the price is q = 1 − F(p), and the expected
revenue is p(1 − F(p)). Conversely, for each probability q of selling, the expected
revenue from setting the corresponding price is q · F−1(1 − q). The revenue curve for a
valuation distribution is the plot of this expected revenue against q ∈ [0, 1]. The price
corresponding to the highest point of the revenue curve is called the monopoly reserve
price, denoted by rmon. 1 A consequence of Theorem 2.0.1 is that the optimal auction for
selling to a single bidder is to set the monopoly reserve as the take-it-or-leave-it price.
Importantly, the derivative of the revenue curve at a quantile q is equal to the virtual
value at the corresponding quantile ϕ(F−1(q)) (we will explain this in more detail in
Chapter 4). Therefore, the condition that ϕ(v) is a monotone increasing function (i.e.,
that F is a regular distribution), is equivalent to the condition that the revenue curve
should be concave.
VCG auctions with eager and lazy reserve prices Another classic auction which lies
at the foundation of much work on mechanism design is the VCG auction [54, 18, 28].
In the VCG auction, the winners are the set of bidders that achieves the maximum sum of
valuations over all feasible sets, and each of them pays the critical valuation below which
he would drop from the winning set. Formally, the set W of winners is argmaxS∈I
∑
i∈S vi,
and the payment made by a bidder in W is pVCGi = inf{vi | i ∈ argmaxS∈I
∑
j∈S v j}.
This payment pVCGi is called the VCG payment or VCG threshold for bidder i. It is a
1When there are multiple prices that maximize the revenue, we always pick the highest price among
them (corresponding to the lowest q) as the monopoly reserve price, throughout the thesis.
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quantity defined solely by the valuations of other bidders and the feasibility system I,
and therefore is well defined for all bidders, including those who lose the auction. For
each bidder, the VCG threshold is the value above which he will win the auction, and
below which he loses. Another interpretation of the VCG payment that we will use in
Section 3.3.3 is that it represents the externality of a winner imposed on the rest of the
bidders, i.e., for a winner i, pVCGi is the decrease in welfare among all other bidders
caused by bidder i’s presence.
Two important facts about VCG auctions are that they are dominant strategy in-
centive compatible and they maximize the social welfare. A special case of the VCG
auction is the second-price single-item auction, where the highest bidder wins the item
and pays the second highest bid.
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CHAPTER 3
LOOKAHEAD AUCTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
In this chapter we start by considering the problem of revenue maximization in a
single-item auction with bidders having correlated valuations, under the constraints of
dominant strategy incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality. A simple
and elegant solution to this problem is the lookahead auction proposed by Ronen [48],
who showed that it gives a 2-approximation to the optimal revenue. In Section 3.2,
we present a generalization, the k-lookahead auctions, which we show gives a 3k−12k−1 -
approximation to the optimal revenue. Then in Section 3.3 we use the idea of the looka-
head auction to study reserve-price-based auctions, which are much simpler and more
commonly used than Myerson’s optimal auctions. Using lookahead auctions, we give
simple proofs for the approximation guarantees of several such auctions.
3.1 Preliminary
For bidders having correlated valuations, Cre´mer and McLean [19] showed that, for
distributions that satisfy a certain “correlation condition”, one can extract full social
surplus by a DSIC but interim IR auction. In such an auction, the expected revenue
is equal to the expected optimal social welfare, the maximum revenue one can hope
for. However, it is crucial that the mechanism is interim IR only, and not ex post IR,
as the mechanism can sometimes, depending on the value profiles, even charge a large
amount from a bidder who does not win the item. When this is undesirable, as for
example when a bidder has a budget that prevents her from paying more than her value
of an outcome, ex post IR is a more realistic requirement. While the optimal auction
in this case for two bidders is completely solved [45, 22], it is known that computing
the optimal deterministic auction for at least three bidders is NP-hard [45], and the only
known algorithm for computing the optimal randomized mechanism is LP-based, with
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a running time exponential in n in the worst case [22]. In Section 3.2 we present an ex
post IR auction that approximates the optimal revenue of any randomized mechanism.
The auction is a generalization of the following simple auction proposed by Ronen
[48] which he called the lookahead auction: choose the highest bidder as the tentative
winner; run an optimal auction for the highest bidder on a conditional distribution of his
valuation, where the conditioning is on all other bidders’ valuations and the fact that this
tentative winner’s valuation is above all others’. It is not hard to see that the lookahead
auction is dominant strategy incentive compabible.
Theorem 3.1.1 (48). The lookahead auction gives at least half of the optimal revenue
in a single item auction, even for bidders with correlated valuations.
Ronen’s proof is elementary, and it is instructive to repeat it here for the purpose
of our generalization in Theorem 3.3.8. The revenue from any auction consists of two
parts: H, the revenue extracted from the highest bidder; and L, the revenue extracted
from the rest of the bidders. Since lookahead always runs the optimal auction for the
highest bidder with all the information present, its revenue is at least H. One way to run
the auction for the highest bidder is simply to charge him the second highest valuation,
which is an upper bound on L. Therefore the lookahead auction’s revenue is no less than
both H and L, and hence gets at least half of the optimal revenue.
3.2 The k-lookahead Auction
In this section we generalize the lookahead auction and analyze the k-lookahead auction
defined as follows. Find the k bidders with the highest values, and denote this set of
bidders by K. Run the revenue-maximizing truthful auction for K conditioned on the
values of bidders in N \ K and the fact that all of the bidders in K have valuations than
those in N \ K. Notice that the auction for K can either be the optimal truthful-in-
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expectation mechanism or the optimal deterministic mechanism.
Theorem 3.2.1. The approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is at least 3k−12k−1 . In
particular, for k = 2 the approximation ratio is at least as good as 53 , and the approxi-
mation ratio is bounded above by 32 as k tends to infinity.
3.2.1 Analysis of the k-Lookahead Auction
Denote the original distribution by D, and denote by DK the conditional distribution
of the values of the bidders in K given the values of bidders in N \ K and the fact that
bidders in K all have higher valuations than those in N \ K. We let vk+1 denote the the
value of the (k + 1)th-highest bidder. We show that one of the following three families
of auctions provides a good approximation ratio. The k-lookahead auction obviously
provides at least as much expected revenue, and the theorem follows. The auctions are
defined for k ≥ 2. The second and third auctions depend on a parameter t ≥ 1, to be
specified later.
1. k-Highest Auction: Run the optimal auction. If one of the bidders in N \ K is
assigned the item in the optimal auction, no bidder is assigned the item and no
one is charged anything. If one of the bidders in K is assigned the item in the
revenue-maximizing auction then assign him the item and charge him as in the
revenue-maximizing auction.
2. t-Fixed Price Auction: Select one bidder (“the reserve bidder”) from K uniformly
at random, denote this bidder by i. If any of the bidders in K \ {i} has value above
t · vk+1 then he receives the item and pays t · vk+1. If there are several such bidders,
break ties arbitrarily. Otherwise, the reserve bidder gets the item and pays vk+1.
3. t-Pivot Auction: Select one bidder (“the pivot”) from K uniformly at random, and
denote this bidder by i. If any of the bidders of in K\{i} has value above t ·vk+1 then
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run the revenue maximizing auction for bidders in K, conditioned on the values
of bidders in N \ K and the fact that all bidders in K have higher valuations than
those in N \ K. Otherwise the pivot bidder gets the item and pays vk+1.
It is straightforward to see that the k-Highest Auction and the t-Fixed Price Auction
are truthful and individually rational1. To see that the t-Pivot Auction is truthful we
observe that this auction is monotone: the only non-straightforward case to check is
when a bidder j other than i raises his value and forces the mechanism to run the optimal
auction. However, in this case bidder j was not allocated the item before raising his
value, so monotonicity is preserved.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1. Throughout this proof, we condition on a fixed valuation pro-
file on N \K. We show that the conditional expected revenue from the k-lookahead auc-
tion approximates the conditional expected revenue from the optimal auction, and there-
fore its expected revenue regardless of the conditioning is still a 3k−12k−1 -approximation.
Let l be the event where no bidder in K has value at least t · vk+1, and let l be the
complement of this event. We partition the expected revenue of the optimal auction:
• let Ll be the expected revenue from bidders in N \ K from instances where event l
occurs.
• let Ll be the expected revenue from bidders in N \ K from instances where event l
occurs.
• Let M be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l
occurs.
• Let H be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l
occurs.
1If the optimal auctions used by the k-Highest Auction and the t-Pivot Auction are deterministic or
universally truthful, then all three auctions are universally truthful, as is their convex combination. In
this case our proof shows that there is a deterministic auction on the k highest bidders that achieves a(
3k−1
2k−1
)
-approximation to the deterministic optimal auction.
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Observe that the expected revenue of the optimal auction is Ll + Ll + H + M. We
continue by proving several lemmas.
Lemma 3.2.2. The expected revenue of the k-Highest Auction is M + H.
Proof. By definition the auction extracts exactly the same revenue as the optimal auction
from bidders in K and no revenue from bidders in N \ K. The lemma follows. 
Lemma 3.2.3. The expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction is at least Ll + Mt +
k−1
k · t · Ll + 1k · Ll.
Proof. First, notice that the revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction in every instance is at
least vk+1 (either the reserve bidder is allocated the item and pays vk+1 or the auction sells
the item at a higher price). Suppose that event l occurs. This case contributes Ll + M to
the expected revenue of the optimal auction. Observe that, if l occurs, in any instance
where the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \ K, its revenue is at most vk+1
(the price for a sold item is at most the value of the bidder), and that in any instance the
optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \K the revenue is at most t ·vk+1. Thus, the
instances where event l occurs contribute Ll + Mt to the expected revenue of the t-Fixed
Price Auction.
Suppose now that event l occurs. Thus, there exists some bidder b with vb > t · vk+1.
With probability exactly k−1k , b is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue
of the auction is t · vk+1. With probability 1k we have that b is the reserve bidder and
the revenue of the auction is at least vk+1. In particular, for every instance where the
optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \ K (at a price of at most vk+1) the t-Fixed
Price Auction has an expected revenue of at least k−1k · t · Ll + 1k · Ll. Together with the
contribution from instances where event l occurs we have that the expected revenue of
the auction is at least Ll + Mt +
k−1
k · t · Ll + 1k · Ll. 
Lemma 3.2.4. The expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction is at least Ll+ Mt +
k−1
k H+
1
k Ll.
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Proof. Suppose that event l occurs. The revenue of the t-Pivot Auction in every instance
where l occurs is vk+1. The expected revenue of the optimal auction in this case is Ll +M,
and similarly to the the analysis of the t-Fixed Price Auction the expected contribution
to the revenue from instances where event l occurs is Ll + Mt .
Suppose that event l occurs. Thus, there exists some bidder b with vb > t · vk+1.
With probability exactly k−1k , b is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue of
the auction is at least H. With probability 1k we have that b is the reserve bidder and
the revenue of the auction is at least 1k · vk+1. Again, similarly to the analysis of the t-
Fixed Price Auction the expected contribution to the revenue when the event l occurs is
k−1
k H+
1
k Ll. Overall, the expected revenue of the auction is at least Ll+
M
t +
k−1
k H+
1
k Ll. 
Next we need some definitions. Conditioned on the values of bidders in N \ K,
let OPT be the revenue of the revenue-maximizing auction, Rh be the revenue of the
k-Highest Auction, R f be the expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction, Rp the
expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction and R = max(R f ,Rp). In addition, for the rest
of the proof we fix t = 2k−1k−1 .
Lemma 3.2.5. R ≥ Ll + Ll + H+Mt .
Proof. We divide the analysis into two cases. Suppose first that Ll · t ≥ H, which implies
that k−1k · (t − 1) · Ll = Ll ≥ Ht by our choice of t. We have that:
R f ≥ Ll + Mt +
k − 1
k
· t · Ll +
1
k
· Ll ≥ Ll +
M
t
+ Ll +
k − 1
k
· (t− 1) · Ll ≥ Ll + Ll +
H + M
t
Suppose now that Ll · t < H:
Rp ≥ Ll+ Mt +
k − 1
k
·H+1
k
·Ll ≥ Ll+
M
t
+
H
t
+
k2 − 2k + 1
k(2k − 1) ·H+
1
k
·Ll > Ll+
M
t
+
H
t
+
k − 1
k
·Ll+
1
k
·Ll
= Ll + Ll +
H + M
t

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We are now finally able to analyze the ratio between the expected revenue of the
revenue-maximizing auction and the k-lookahead auction. We consider two cases and
show that in each one the expected ratio is at most 2 − 1t = 3k−12k−1 . In the first case we
assume that Ll + Ll ≤ (H + M)(1 − 1t ). Therefore,
OPT
Rh
≤ Ll + Ll + H + M
H + M
≤ (H + M)(1 −
1
t ) + H + M
H + M
= 2 − 1
t
Now assume that Ll + Ll > (H + M)(1 − 1t ). We have that, using Lemma 3.2.5:
OPT
R
≤ Ll + Ll + H + M
Ll + Ll +
H+M
t
<
(H + M)(1 − 1t ) + H + M
(H + M)(1 − 1t ) + H+Mt
= 2 − 1
t
.

3.3 Reserve-price-based Auctions for Independent Distributions
The lookahead auction was developed as a mechanism to approximate optimal revenue
under correlated distributions. However, in this section, we will see that it is powerful
in analyzing reserve-based variants of the VCG auction. These auctions allocate the
item(s) in a manner that maximizes the social welfare, except that the bidders’ values
have to be above a certain threshold called the reserve price2. These auctions are proba-
bly the most ubiquitous in practice, at least much more common than the optimal auction
given by Myerson [43] (Theorem 2.0.1). Hartline and Roughgarden [32] pioneered the
study of revenue guarantees of such auctions. It is reassuring that under fairly general
assumptions such auctions are shown to generate near-optimal revenues.
As indicated below, most results on reserve-based auctions shown in this section
are rederivations of previously known theorems from Hartline and Roughgarden [32],
Dhangwatnotai et al. [21] and Azar et al. [4]. The main contribution of this section is
2When the same reserve price is used for all bidders, it can be interpreted as the value of the auctioneer
for the item being auctioned, and the VCG auction with a reserve is genuinely a social welfare maximizing
mechanism in this case.
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a unified framework via lookahead auctions that considerably simplifies these results.
Also, we develop a generalization of the lookahead auction to matroid settings in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
We first define a pair of properties for valuation distributions that are strictly more gen-
eral than regularity. Most results presented in this section will apply to distributions
satisfying these properties.
Definition 3.3.1 (Prepeak Monotonicity). A valuation distribution is said to be prepeak
monotone if the revenue curve is an increasing function for q on [0, q∗], where q∗ is the
quantile corresponding to the monopoly reserve.
In other words, a distribution is prepeak monotone if the expected revenue monoton-
ically decreases as the price rises above the monopoly reserve. Prepeak monotonicity is
a strictly weaker property than regularity. On one hand, prepeak monotonicity does not
require any condition on the revenue curve to the right of its highest point; on the other
hand, to the left of its peak, only monotonicity but not concavity is required.
Symmetrically, we say a distribution is postpeak monotone if the revenue curve is
a decreasing function for q on [q∗, 1]. In other words, before the price reaches the
monopoly reserve, the expected revenue monotonically increases as one raises the price.
Postpeak monotonicity is also a strictly weaker condition than regularity.
There are two subtle variants of the VCG auctions depending on when the reserves
are applied. Denote by ri the reserve price for bidder i.
Definition 3.3.2 (VCG Auctions with Lazy Reserve Prices (VCG-L)). In the VCG auc-
tion with lazy reserve prices, the mechanism first chooses a tentative subset W of winners
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as in the VCG auction, i.e., W = argmaxS∈I
∑
i∈S vi. Then each bidder i ∈ W is presented
a take-it-or-leave-it price set to be the higher of ri and pVCGi .
We note that VCG-L is well-defined only for downward-closed settings, since we
require any subset of W to be feasible.
Definition 3.3.3 (VCG Auctions with Eager Reserve Prices (VCG-E)). In the VCG
auction with eager reserve prices, all bidders whose valuations are below their respective
reserve prices are excluded from the auction. Then the VCG auction is run among the
remaining bidders, with the payment for winner i set to be the higher of ri and pVCGi .
3
Both variants of the VCG auction are dominant strategy incentive compatible. (In
particular, in VCG-E, a bidder i with vi < ri has no incentive to pretend to have a higher
value in order to avoid elimination at the start of the auction, because even if he does so
and wins the auction, he will face a payment of at least ri, which renders him a negative
utility.) When the reserve price for each bidder is set to be the monopoly reserve of
that bidder, i.e., ri = rmoni ,∀i, the corresponding auctions are called VCG auctions with
monopoly reserve prices, denoted as VCG-LM and VCG-EM, respectively, for lazy and
eager reserve prices.
It is easy to see that, in a single-item auction, if a bidder eventually wins (i.e., takes
the service at the offered price) in VCG-L, he also wins in VCG-E, while the reverse is
not true. In general, we have:
Proposition 3.3.1. When using the same reserve prices, VCG-E results in weakly more
social welfare than VCG-L in auctions with downward-closed feasible constraints.
Proof. Recall from Chapter 2 that I is the set of feasible sets. Fix the valuation profile
v1, . . . , vn, and reserve prices r1, . . . , rn, let N′ be {i ∈ [n] | vi ≥ ri}, and let I′ be
{T ⊆ [n] | T = S ∩ N′, S ∈ I}. By downward closure, VCG-E simply allocates
3Both the winning set and the VCG payments here are calculated among the remaining bidders only.
19
to bidders in a set T that maximizes the sum of valuations over I′, whereas VCG-
L tentatively chooses a set S that maximizes the sum of valuations over I, and then
allocates to the bidders in S ∩ N′, which is also a set in I′. It is clear that the social
welfare in VCG-E is at least that in VCG-L. 
3.3.2 Single Item Settings
In this section we first look at the implications of lookahead auctions for single-item
auctions with independently drawn valuations. In Section 3.3.3 we will generalize all
results in this section. In this section we will use the terms “second price auction” and
“VCG auction” interchangeably.
Our first step is a comparative study of revenues from VCG-L and VCG-E. As we
will see later, VCG-L in general is easier to analyze by way of the lookahead auctions,
and the following theorem enables us to pass approximation guarantees for VCG-L to
VCG-E as well.
Theorem 3.3.2. In a single item auction where bidders’ valuations are drawn inde-
pendently from prepeak monotone distributions, the second price auction with eager
monopoly reserve prices (VCG-EM) generates weakly more revenue than the second
price auction with lazy monopoly reserve prices (VCG-LM).
Proof. The key idea of the proof is to consider the expected revenue from each bidder,
conditioning on the other bidders’ valuations. We calculate the conditional expected
revenues from the two auctions and compare them. The computation of the conditional
revenue does not assume conditions on the reserve price or the valuation distribution;
only in the last step do we use the property of monopoly reserves and the valuation
distribution’s prepeak monotonicity.
Fix a bidder i, we condition on all other bidders’ valuations. Denote by hL−i the
highest valuation among these other bidders, i.e., hL−i = max j{v j | j , i}. Denote by hE−i
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the highest valuation among bidders except i who bid above their reserve prices, i.e.,
hE−i = max j{v j | j , i, v j ≥ r j}. Clearly, hL−i ≥ hE−i.
When hL−i ≤ ri, the revenue extracted from bidder i is exactly the same in VCG-E and
VCG-L, because in both auctions, bidder i will make a payment if and only if his bid is
at least ri, in which case he pays ri. Therefore we need only consider the case hL−i > ri.
In VCG-L, bidder i makes a payment of hL−i if and only if his valuation is above h
L
−i
(since hL−i > ri). The expected revenue from him is then h
L
−i(1 − Fi(hL−i)). In VCG-E,
bidder i makes a payment if and only if his valuation is above both ri and hE−i, and the
payment is pEi = max{ri, hE−i}. The expected revenue from i is therefore pEi (1 − Fi(pEi )).
Note that hL−i ≥ max{ri, hE−i} = pEi .
But the revenues hL−i(1−Fi(hL−i)) and pEi (1−Fi(pEi )) are simply the expected revenue
we get by setting a price of hL−i or p
E
i to bidder i, respectively. By prepeak monotonicity
of the valuation distribution, the expected revenue monotonically decreases as we raise
the price above the monopoly reserve. Since hL−i ≥ pEi ≥ ri = rmoni , we have
hL−i(1 − Fi(hL−i)) ≤ pEi (1 − Fi(pEi )).
The above is a conditional analysis, but we see that the expected revenue in VCG-
LM from each bidder i is no more than the expected revenue in VCG-EM from the same
bidder, no matter what the other bidders bid. Our theorem immediately follows. 
We now develop a connection between VCG-L and the lookahead auction, and ex-
plore its consequences.
Theorem 3.3.3. The lookahead auction extracts at least as much revenue as VCG-L with
any reserve prices. When bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from prepeak
monotone distributions, the lookahead auction and the second price auction with lazy
monopoly reserve prices are identical.
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Proof. Since VCG-L only sells to and possibly charges the highest bidder, from whom
the lookahead extracts the optimal revenue, the first part of the theorem is obvious. We
now look at the second part.
By definition, the lookahead auction runs the optimal auction for the highest bider,
conditioning on that his valuation is higher than all other bidders’. 4 Since the optimal
auction for any single bidder is simply to set a take-it-or-leave-it price [43], we only
need to see what price we should set for the highest bidder.
Let i be the highest bidder, and denote by h−i the second highest bid. The distribution
of vi, conditioning on vi ≥ h−i is just Fi truncated at h−i, i.e., Fcondi (v) = Fi(v)−F(h−i)1−Fi(h−i) , for
any v ≥ h−i, and Fcondi (v) = 0 for any v < h−i. Setting any price below h−i would be
obviously suboptimal, and the revenue of setting a price of p ≥ h−i is
p(1 − Fcondi (p)) = p ·
(
1 − Fi(p) − Fi(h−i)
1 − Fi(h−i)
)
= p(1 − Fi(p)) · 11 − Fi(h−i) .
In words, for prices above h−i, the conditional expected revenue is simply scaled up by a
constant factor of 11−Fi(h−i) from the unconditioned distribution. Therefore, if h−i < r
mon
i ,
the optimal price to set for the conditional distribution is still rmoni ; and if h−i ≥ rmoni , by
prepeak monotonicity, the expected revenue monotonically decreases as the price rises
above h−i; therefore the optimal price to set is h−i itself.
To summarize, in the lookahead auction, we temporarily pick the highest bidder, and
set a take-it-or-leave-it price that is the higher of rmoni , the monopoly reserve price, and
h−i, the second highest bid. This is exactly the second price auction with lazy monopoly
reserve prices. 
Theorem 3.3.3 combined with Theorem 3.1.1 and Theorem 3.3.2 immediately gives
the following corollary, a special case of Theorem 3.16 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [21] and
Theorem 3.7 in Hartline and Roughgarden [32].
4Unlike the correlated settings considered by Ronen [48], here we assume independence, and so con-
ditioning on the other bidders’ valuations has no effect on the distribution of the highest bidder.
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Corollary 3.3.4 (21, 32). For a single item auction, the second price auction with ei-
ther lazy or eager monopoly reserve prices extracts at least half of the optimal revenue
for bidders whose valuations are drawn independently from prepeak monotone distribu-
tions.
We will see in Section 3.3.3 that our approach easily generalizes to matroid settings,
matching the original theorems. The proof presented here, especially that for VCG-L
(for which we do not need Theorem 3.3.2), is considerably shorter and less involved
than the original proofs in the literature. In particular, we do not appeal to Myerson
[43]’s characterization of optimal auctions with virtual valuations.
Remark 3.3.5. The theorems in Dhangwatnotai et al. [21] and Hartline and Roughgar-
den [32] are stated and proved for bidders with regular distributions, although their proof
easily generalizes to prepeak monotone distributions.
3.3.3 Matroid Settings
In this section we extend all results from Section 3.3.2 to the more general matroid
settings. We first generalize Theorem 3.3.2 to matroid settings.
Theorem 3.3.6. In a matroid setting where bidders’ valuations are drawn independently
from prepeak monotone distributions, VCG auctions with eager monopoly reserves ex-
tract weakly more revenue than VCG auctions with lazy monopoly reserves.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3.2, we focus on the expected revenue from a fixed
bidder i, conditioning on all other bidders’ valuations. Let pVCGLi and p
VCGE
i denote the
VCG payment for bidder i in VCG-L and VCG-E, respectively. (Note that the actual
payment to be made by bidder i in these auctions is the higher of the reserve ri and the
VCG threshold; but we will focus mostly on the VCG thresholds in this proof.) The key
step is to show pVCGLi ≥ pVCGEi . Recall that in VCG-E, bidders with valuations below
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their reserve prices are excluded from both the allocation and payment calculation. Ef-
fectively, such bidders’ bids are replaced by 0 in the calculation of VCG payments. This
constitutes the only difference in computing pVCGLi and p
VCGE
i . It therefore suffices to
show that bidder i’s VCG payment weakly decreases as other bidders’ bids are zeroed
out.
We show this by expressing pVCGLi and p
VCGE
i in terms of a submodular function.
Define a set function f : 2[n] → R by
f (S ) = max
T⊆S ,T∈I
∑
j∈T
v′j,
where v′j = v j for j , i and v
′
i =
∑
j,i v j + 1. Then pVCGLi = f ([n] \ {i}) − ( f ([n] − v′i).
This is because f ([n] \ {i}) represents the social welfare of the other bidders if i were
not present, and f ([n]) − v′i represents the social welfare of the other bidders if i were
to be a winner (v′i is set high enough such that the optimal set has to include i). The
difference between the two is then the externality that i imposes on the other bidders by
his winning, and therefore is equal to the VCG threshold pVCGLi . Similarly, let U denote
the set of bidders whose valuations are above their reserve prices, i.e., U = { j | v j ≥ r j},
then pVCGEi = f (U) − ( f (U ∪ {i}) − v′i).
f is defined to be the result of a linear maximization over a matroid, and is well
known to be submodular. Therefore, as U ⊆ [n], f ([n])− f ([n]\ {i}) ≤ f (U∪{i})− f (U).
This gives pVCGLi ≥ pVCGEi .
With this, the proof to Theorem 3.3.2 easily generalizes by replacing hL−i and h
E
−i with
pVCGLi and p
VCGE
i , respectively, and we omit the rest of the proof. 
Remark 3.3.7. For more general environments (even downward closed), it need not be
true that pVCGLi is at least p
VCGE
i . For example, consider I = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {3}}. In
this feasibility system, bidder 1’s VCG payment weakly increases when v2 decreases.
So pVCGL1 can be lower than p
VCGE
1 .
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In order to generalize Theorem 3.3.3, we first define a generalization of lookahead
auctions for downward-closed settings.
Definition 3.3.4. The lookahead auction for a downward closed setting first selects a
tentative set W of winners as in the VCG auction, i.e., W = argmaxS∈I
∑
i∈S vi, and then
runs an optimal auction for each bidder i in W conditioning on (a) all other bidders’
valuations and (b) the fact that bidder i’s valuation is above the VCG threshold pVCGi .
We first generalize Theorem 3.1.1 to matroid settings.
Theorem 3.3.8. The lookahead auction for matroid settings is a truthful mechanism
that obtains at least half of the optimal revenue, even when the bidders’ valuations are
correlated.
To prove Theorem 3.3.8, we will need the next well-known theorem on matroids.
(See, e.g., [50], for a proof.)
Theorem 3.3.9. Let B1 and B2 be any two independent sets of a matroidM such that
|B1| = |B2|. There exists a bijective mapping g : B1 \B2 → B2 \B1 such that ∀e ∈ B1 \B2,
B1 \ {e} ∪ {g(e)} is independent inM.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.8. First, the lookahead auction is incentive compatible for similar
reasons as in the single-item auction: a bidder not in W has no incentive to raise his bid
to enter W, because the price he faces in the second stage will be at least the valuation
threshold to enter W.
We then show the revenue guarantee. Denote by RevLA the expected revenue of the
lookahead auction. The revenue of any optimal auction can be split into two parts, H
and L: H is the expected revenue from W, and L the revenue from the rest of the bidders.
Note that W here is random, determined by the realization of bidders’ valuations, but H
and L are expected values and not random. It suffices to show that RevLA is no less than
both H and L.
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RevLA is clearly at least H, since the lookahead auction runs the optimal auction for
bidders in W, using all information available at that stage.
Let T ⊆ [n] \W be an independent subset that maximizes the social welfare among
bidders not in W. The expectation of
∑
j∈T v j is an upper bound for L, since the auction
cannot charge more than the winning bidders’ valuations. Therefore it suffices to show
RevLA ≥ E[∑ j∈T v j]. Since |T | ≤ |W |, we can find a subset U ⊆ W such that U ∪ T
is independent and |U ∪ T | = |W |. By Theorem 3.3.9 there exists a bijective mapping
g : W \ U → T such that for any bidder i in W \ U, W \ {i} ∪ {g(i)} is independent.
Therefore, the VCG threshold for each i ∈ W \ U is at least vg(i). In the second stage
of the lookahead auction, the auctioneer could simply set the VCG payment for each
bidder in W and secure a revenue of at least
∑
j∈T v j. By the optimality of the revenue
from W in the lookahead auction, we have RevLA ≥ E[∑ j∈T v j] ≥ L. 
Theorem 3.3.3 extends straightforwardly to general downward-closed settings since
all arguments therein concern a single bidder. We omit its proof:
Theorem 3.3.10. In any downward closed setting, the lookahead auction gets at least
as much revenue as VCG-L with any reserve prices. Moreover, when bidders’ valuations
are drawn independently from prepeak monotone distributions, the lookahead auction
and the VCG auction with lazy monopoly reserve prices are identical.
Corollary 3.3.4 now generalizes to matroid settings, which amounts to a proof of
both Theorem 3.16 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [21] and Theorem 3.7 in Hartline and Rough-
garden [32].
Corollary 3.3.11 (21, 32). In matroid settings where bidders’ valuations are drawn in-
dependently from prepeak monotone distributions, the VCG auction with lazy monopoly
reserve prices gives at least half of the optimal revenue.
Since the lookahead auctions have a very simple guiding philosophy, the conceptual
connection between VCG-L and lookahead auctions promises to greatly simplify the
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analysis of VCG-L in general. As another application of this connection, we give a
considerably shorter and elementary proof for Theorem 3.1 in Azar et al. [4], which is a
major building block in that work.
Let Ri(p) denote the expected revenue from bidder i by setting a price of p.
Theorem 3.3.12 (Theorem 3.1 in 4). For each bidder i, let ri be a price drawn ran-
domly from a certain distribution and independently from the valuation vi, such that in
the single-bidder setting, Eri[Ri(ri)] ≥ αRi(rmoni ). Then in all downward closed settings
where bidders’ valuations are drawn indepdendently from postpeak monotone distri-
butions, VCG-L with random reserve prices (r1, . . . , rn) gets at least α-fraction of the
revenue of VCG-L with monopoly reserve prices (VCG-LM). 5
Proof. Fix a tentative winner i ∈ W, and condition on the VCG price pVCGi . For a reserve
price ri, let ρ denote the ratio Ri(ri)/Ri(rmoni ), then we have E[ρ] ≥ α. Let ρcond denote
the ratio between the expected VCG-L revenue from bidder i using reserve price ri and
that from VCG-LM, conditioning on vi ≥ pVCGi . It suffices to show E[ρcond] ≥ α. We
will show ρcond ≥ ρ pointwise. 6 Since, as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 3.3.3,
the revenue from all prices above pVCGi is scaled up by a factor of 1/(1−Fi(pVCGi )) when
conditioning on vi ≥ pVCGi , for ri ≥ pVCGi we have
ρcond =
Ri(ri)/(1 − Fi(pVCGi ))
Ri(max{pVCGi , rmoni })/(1 − Fi(pVCGi ))
≥ Ri(ri)
Ri(rmoni )
= ρ.
For ri < pVCGi , if p
VCG
i ≥ rmoni , then both auctions will use pVCGi , and ρcond = 1 ≥ ρ; if
pVCGi < r
mon
i , we have
ρcond =
Ri(pVCGi )/(1 − Fi(pVCGi ))
Ri(rmoni )/(1 − Fi(pVCGi ))
=
Ri(pVCGi )
Ri(rmoni )
≥ Ri(ri)
Ri(rmoni )
= ρ.
5Azar et al. [4] stated the theorem for regular distributions, though their proof generalizes to postpeak
monotone distributions.
6To clarify, ρ is a random variable that depends only on the value of ri, whereas ρcond is a random
variable that depends on both ri and pVCGi . To prove ρ
cond ≥ ρ “pointwise”, we are going to show that, for
any value of ri and pVCGi , ρ
cond ≥ ρ.
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The last inequality comes from postpeak monotonicity, i.e., ri < pVCGi ≤ rmoni implies
Ri(ri) ≤ Ri(pVCGi ). This completes the proof. 
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CHAPTER 4
MARGINAL REVENUE MECHANISMS
4.1 Introduction
Marginal revenue plays a fundamental role in microeconomic theory. For example, a
monopolist providing a commodity to two markets each with its own concave revenue
(as a function of the supply provided to that market) optimizes her profit by dividing
her total supply to equate the marginal revenues across the two markets. Moreover this
central economic principle also governs classical auction theory. Myerson [43] char-
acterizes profit maximizing single-item auction as formulaically optimizing the virtual
value of the winner; Bulow and Roberts [9] reinterpret Myerson’s virtual value as the
marginal revenue of a certain concave revenue curve.
Because it is simple and intuitive, the Myerson-Bulow-Roberts approach provides
the basis for much of Bayesian auction theory. Unfortunately though, the theory is lim-
ited to settings where agents have linear single-dimensional preferences, i.e., where an
agent’s utility is given by her value for service less her payment. Consequently, Bayesian
auction theory is often similarly limited. With more general forms of agent preferences,
especially multi-dimensionality, e.g., for multi-item auctions, or non-linearity, e.g., risk
aversion or budgets, auction theory is complex, less versatile, and often not well under-
stood.
Our main result in this chapter is to show that hidden under the complexity of op-
timal mechanism design problems for agents with multi-dimensional and non-linear
(henceforth: general) preferences is marginal revenue maximization. The approach of
marginal revenue maximization expresses a multi-agent mechanism design problem as
a composition of simple single-agent mechanism design problems, i.e., from the con-
struction of the appropriate notion of revenue curves. This new approach for general
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preferences uncovers a condition we refer to as revenue linearity that contains all linear
single-dimensional preferences and governs the performance of the marginal revenue
mechanism. When the single agent problems are revenue linear, marginal revenue max-
imization is optimal and the Myerson-Bulow-Roberts mechanism generalizes exactly.
When the single agent problems are approximately revenue linear, marginal revenue
maximization is approximately optimal (though the composition of the single agent
mechanisms to implement marginal revenue maximization requires new techniques).
Finally, because our marginal revenue approach is structurally similar to the classical
approach, many results from classical auction theory approximately and automatically
extend to general preferences.
A central result to classical auction theory comes from reinterpreting the Myerson-
Bulow-Roberts mechanism (i.e., for maximizing marginal revenue) in the special case
of symmetric agents. As an example of the benefits of our approach, compare this
classical reinterpretation with a similar reinterpretation of our results. In the classical
setting there is a single item for sale and agents with i.i.d. values for it; in our setting
there is a single item for sale which the seller can configure on one of several ways and
agents have i.i.d. values for each configuration, e.g., a car that can be painted red or blue
(importantly, the seller sets the configuration and the buyer cannot change it).
Selling a car Classical auction theory says that (a) the optimal way to sell an object
(henceforth: a car) to a single agent with value drawn from a uniform distribution
on [0, 1] is to post a take-it-or-leave-it price of 1/2, (b) the optimal way to sell a
car to one of multiple agents with uniformly distributed values is to run a second-
price auction with reserve price 1/2, and (c) more generally the optimal way to
sell the car to multiple agents with i.i.d. values is to run the second price auction
with the same reserve price that would be offered as a take-it-or-leave-it price to
one agent (assuming the distribution satisfies some mild assumptions).
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Selling a red-or-blue car Consider selling a car that on sale can be painted one of two
colors, red or blue.1 Our theory says that (a) the optimal way to sell a red-or-blue
car to a single agent with values for the different colors each drawn independently
and uniformly from [0, 1] is to post a take-it-or-leave-it price of
√
1/3 for either
color, (b) the optimal way to sell a red-or-blue car to one of multiple agents each
with i.i.d. uniform values for each color is to run the second-price auction with
reserve
√
1/3 and allow the winning agent to choose her favorite color on sale,
and (c) more generally to sell a red-or-blue car to one of multiple agents each with
values drawn i.i.d. (from a distribution that satisfies the same mild assumptions as
above) for each color, the second price auction with the reserve price equal to the
same price that would be offered to a single agent is (at worst) a 4 approximation
to the optimal auction.
It should be noted that reducing the multi-dimensional preference to a single-
dimensional preference by always selling the winning agent her favorite color is very
natural and practical; however, it is not generally optimal beyond U[0, 1]. Even for a
single agent with values for both colors distribution uniformly on [5, 6], an analysis of
Thanassoulis [52] shows that the optimal auction does not sell the agent her favorite
item subject to a reserve (in fact, it is not even deterministic).
Approach We focus on service constrained environments where in any outcome the
mechanism produces, each agent is either considered served or unserved. The designer
has a feasibility constraint that governs which subset of agents can be simultaneously
served, but other aspects of the outcome, e.g., payments, are unconstrained. This model
allows additional unconstrained attributes of the service (e.g., the color of the car in the
previous red-or-blue car example). We assume that the space of mechanisms is closed
1While the reserve prices given are for two colors, with the appropriate reserve price the approximation
bounds hold for any number of colors.
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under convex combination which allows for randomized mechanisms.
The agents in the mechanism have independently but not necessarily identically dis-
tributed preferences (a.k.a., types). We do not place any assumption on the agent pref-
erences other than they are expected utility maximizers. This includes the most chal-
lenging preference models in Bayesian mechanism design such as multi-dimensionality,
public or private budgets, and risk-aversion (e.g., as given by a concave utility function).
Revenue curves defined in Chapter 2 can be generalized by the following single-
agent mechanism design problem. Consider a single agent with preferences drawn from
a known distribution. Via the taxation principle (e.g., 55) the outcomes of a mechanism,
for all possible preference reports the agent might make, can be viewed as a menu where
the agent selects her favorite outcome by making the appropriate report. Of course with
different preferences the agent would potentially select different outcomes. This menu
may contain outcomes that are randomized and for this reason we refer to it as a lottery
pricing. Ex ante, i.e., in expectation over the distribution of the agent’s preference,
a lottery pricing induces a probability with which the agent receives an outcome that
corresponds to service, and an expected payment, i.e., revenue.
As every lottery pricing induces an ex ante service probability and revenue, we can
ask the optimization question of identifying the lottery pricing with a given ex ante
service probability that has the highest expected revenue. We can also consider this
optimal revenue as a function of the ex ante service probability, giving rise to the agent’s
revenue curve. Important in the construction of revenue curves are the lottery pricings,
i.e., single-agent mechanisms, that give the optimal revenue for each ex ante service
probability. As the space of (mechanisms and hence) lottery pricings is closed under
convex combination, the revenue curves are always concave. The marginal revenue
curve is the derivative of the revenue curve with respect to ex ante service probability.
As discussed in the opening paragraph, the standard economic intuition suggests
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that a monopolist splitting the sale of a commodity between two markets should do so
to equate marginal revenue. There is an intuitive algorithmic reinterpretation of this fact.
If we break the allocation to each market into tiny pieces and attribute to each piece the
change in revenue from adding that piece (i.e., the marginal revenue), then the total
revenue of an allocation is the sum of the marginal revenues of each piece. A simple
algorithm for optimizing this cumulated marginal revenue is to repeatedly allocate a tiny
amount to the market that has the highest marginal revenue at its current allocation (until
the good is totally allocated or marginal revenues are non-positive). Clearly this results
in a final allocation where the markets marginal revenues are roughly equal as in the
microeconomic interpretation. This allocation is optimal.
Our main contribution is a methodology for constructing multi-agent mechanisms
from the simple single-agent lottery pricings that define the revenue curve. The main
task of such a construction is to specify a method for combining the single agent mech-
anisms into a multi-agent mechanism that is both feasible with respect to the service
constraint and obtains good revenue. We refer to the family of mechanisms that take the
following form as marginal revenue mechanisms.
1. Map each agent type (which may lie in an arbitrary type space) to a quantile in
[0, 1].
2. Calculate the marginal revenue of each agent as the derivative of the revenue curve
at her quantile.
3. Select for service the set of agents that maximize cumulative marginal revenue
subject to feasibility.
4. Calculate for each agent the appropriate non-service aspects of the outcome, e.g.,
payments.
Thus far in the discussion only steps 2 and 3 should be clear. The remaining steps
are non-trivial in general and a main issue that we will be resolving.
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Results This chapter generalizes the marginal-revenue approach for agents with
single-dimensional linear preferences which is due to Bulow and Roberts [9] to general
preferences. Our main algorithmic contribution is to generalize Steps 1 and 4 thereby
reducing service constrained multi-agent mechanism design problems to (single agent)
ex ante constrained lottery pricing problems. There are a number of challenges in this
endeavor. First, revenue equivalance does not hold for general preferences (which is
used in the proof of optimality for single-dimensional preferences). Second, there is
not a natural ordering on preferences for general preferences (making it difficult to map
preferences to quantiles). Third, the set of agents served by the marginal revenue mecha-
nism maybe randomized. None of these issues are present for single-dimensional linear
preferences. Finally, the reduction focuses attention on this lottery pricing problem as a
fundamental building block of good mechainsms. For general preferences these lottery
pricing problems have not previously been considered in the literature.
Orthogonal to the question of implementing the marginal revenue mechanism for
general preferences are questions of quantifying its performance. Via the Myerson-
Bulow-Roberts analysis it is known that for single-dimensional linear preferences, the
marginal revenue mechanism is optimal. As a first step in understanding the perfor-
mance of the mechanism more generally we give a new rederivation of the optimality
for single-dimensinal agents that exposes a previously unobserved property of single-
dimensional preferences which we refer to as revenue linearity. The optimality of the
marginal revenue mechanism is implied by revenue linearity. Moreover, if the single-
agent problems are approximately revenue linear (e.g., bounded from below by a linear
function and from above by α times the function), then marginal revenue maximization
is an α-approximation to the optimal mechanism.
Revisiting our red-or-blue car examples above, (a) is a description of the optimal
unconstrained lottery pricing, (b) is a consequence of the revenue-linearity of types that
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are uniformly distributed on a multi-dimensional hypercube, and (c) is a consequence
of 4-approximate revenue linearity for agents with types drawn from any product distri-
bution.
One of the main benefits of considering the marginal revenue mechanism for approx-
imately optimal mechanism design is that, as its structure is similar to optimal mecha-
nisms for single-dimensional environments, many results from the extensive literature
can be easily generalized. The following are some of the most important consequences.
algorithmic mechanism design When weighted optimization is hard we can replace
an exact algorithm for weighted maximization with any approximation algorithm
using either of the single-dimensional black-box reductions of Hartline and Lucier
[31] and Hartline et al. [33].
sequential posted pricing Sequential posted pricing mechanisms of Chawla et al. [16]
and Yan [56] that are approximately optimal for single-dimensional agents are
approximately optimal for general agents (in the same service constrained en-
vironment) and the same approximation factor is guaranteed. Moreover, these
sequential posted pricing bounds give another bound on the approximation factor
of the marginal revenue mechanism. The marginal revenue mechanism is in fact
optimal within a class of mechanisms that contains the sequential posted pricing
mechanisms; therefore, its approximation factor is no worse. As an example, for
the single-item service constraint, a sequential posted pricing bound implies an
e/(e − 1)-approximation regardless of approximate linearity of the lottery pricing
problems.
simple versus optimal While our marginal revenue mechanism is already generally
much simpler than the optimal mechanism, we can get even simpler approxima-
tion mechanisms by appling methods for proving that simple mechanisms ap-
proximate the marginal revenue mechanism that have been developed for single-
35
dimensional preferences. In particular, Hartline and Roughgarden [32] show that
in single-dimensional environments maximizing marginal revenue is more com-
plex than simple reserve-price-based mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that maxi-
mize welfare subject to a reserve price. Nonetheless, they show that reserve-
price-based mechanisms are often approximately optimal. When the structure of
the optimal lottery pricings is simple, e.g., in generalizations of the red-or-blue
car example, these mechanisms extend to general preferences.
single-sample mechanisms Approaches above have been for Bayesian optimal mech-
anism design where the designer optimizes a mechanism given a distribution of
preferences. Dhangwatnotai et al. [21] relax the assumption that the distribution
is known and show that a mechanism based on drawing a single sample from
the distribution gives a good approximation to the Bayesian optimal mechanism.
Again, the single-sample framework extends to general preferences for which the
structure of optimal lottery pricings is simple.
It is important to contrast the simplicity of the marginal revenue approach with re-
cent algorithmic results in Bayesian mechanism design for general agent preferences.
Recently, Alaei et al. [1] and Cai et al. [11, 12, 13] gave polynomial time mechanisms
for large important classes of Bayesian mechanism deign problems; the former consid-
ered general preferences in service constrained settings (as does this chapter) and the
latter considered multi-dimensional additive preferences. The two main conclusions of
these works is that (a) optimal mechanisms continue to have weighted maximization at
their core, and (b) the appropriate weights (i.e., virtual values) are stochastic and can be
solved for as a convex optimization problem, e.g., via ellipsoid method, that takes into
account the feasibility constraint and the distribution over types of all agents. (This lat-
ter result is simply because the space of mechanisms is convex, any point on the interior
of a convex set can be implemented by a convex combination of vertices, and vertices
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correspond to linear, a.k.a., weighted, optimization.) There are a number of important
distinctions between the results in this chapter and these algorithmic results. First, the
weights in our derivation have a natural economic interpretation as marginal revenue.
Second, the weights in our derivation can be found easily from solutions to the single-
agent lottery pricing problems and are not derived from the solution to an additional
optimization problem. Third, in most cases, the weights in our derivation depend only
on the single-agent problem and not on the multi-agent feasibility constraint or presence
of other agents. Therefore, our approach affords significant structural simplification and
interpretation that enables the consequences previously enumerated. Finally, one of the
biggest open questions in the above algorithmic work is in developing approaches that
are not brute-force in each agent’s type space. For example, our approach gives mecha-
nisms for multi-dimensional unit-demand agents with values from a product distribution
that are polynomial in the demensionality of the of the type space (logarithmic in the
size of the typespace).
Organization of the Chapter In Section 4.2 we review the Myerson-Bulow-Roberts
single-dimensional linear agent model, their approach to Bayesian optimal mechanism
design, and give a new proof that the marginal revenue mechanism is revenue optimal.
The proof follows from an argument that for single-dimensional linear agents a class of
single-agent lottery pricing problems satisfies a natural revenue linearity property.
In Section 4.3 we formalize our service constrained model for general preferences
and generalize the marginal revenue derivation to general preferences that satisfy the
previously identified revenue linearity property. In Section 4.4 we extend the marginal
revenue mechanism to general preferences regardless of revenue linearity. We show
that approximate linearity implies approximate optimality and give general methods for
implementing the marginal revenue mechanism (e.g., Steps 1 and 4).
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4.2 Warmup: Single-dimensional Linear Preference
In this section we warm up by giving a new proof that the marginal revenue mechanism
is revenue optimal for agents with single-dimensional linear preferences. In this proof
we will introduce many concepts that make our generalization possible (which were not
present in previous proofs), though in the simpler single-dimensional setting where they
are more straightforward. The basic approach is as follows. We formulate an important
class of lottery pricing problems the solution to which define a revenue curve. We
show that single-dimensional agents are revenue linear in the sense that it is optimal to
decompose the allocation to any agent as a convex combination of the solutions to these
lottery pricing problems. Finally, we observe that this implies that the optimal revenue
can be expressed in terms of the cumulative (over agents served) marginal revenue (given
by the derivative of the revenue curve). The marginal revenue mechanism optimizes this
latter term pointwise and, therefore, also in expectation. In the interest of brevity we
will keep the discussion informal, the proof here subsumed by the generalization in
Section 4.3 which we give formally.
Model We first give a more detailed and intuitive interpretation of the revenue curve
defined in Chapter 2. The geometry of single-dimensional auction theory is more read-
ily apparent when we index an agent’s strength relative to the distribution (instead of
values). Let V(q) = F−1(1−q) be the inverse demand curve, i.e., V(qˆ) is the posted price
that would be accepted by the qˆ measure of highest-valued agents (and rejected by all
others). The quantile of an agent is the measure of agents with higher values, i.e., for
value v the agent’s quantile is q = V−1(v). Importantly, for v drawn at random from the
distribution, q = V−1(v) is uniform on [0, 1] (therefore, expectations of functions of q
are given by integrals with probability density one).
A multi-agent mechanism design problem is given by n such single-dimensional
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agents each with their respective inverse demand curves (which may be distinct) and a
feasibility constraint governing the subsets of agents that can be simultaneously served.
In the interim stage, i.e., when an agent knows her own value but not the values of other
agents, the mechanism looks to the agent like a single-agent mechanism. It will thus
be sufficient for most of the analysis of optimal multi-agent mechanisms to consider the
appropriate single-agent problems.
From the perspective of an agent in a single-agent mechanism and as a function of
the agent’s report, the agent is served with some probability and makes some expected
payment. We can view this function as a menu of service probabilities and expected
payments where the agent selects her favorite outcome by submitting the corresponding
report. Notice that depending on the agent’s value for service, she may choose different
outcomes. We may as well index the outcomes in the menu by the quantile of the agent
that selects the outcome, i.e., agent with quantile q chooses outcome (x(q), q(q)). We
assume that outcome (x, p) = (0, 0) is in the menu. This relabeling and assumption
imply incentive compatibility and individual rationality, respectively, i.e.,
V(q)x(q) − q(q) ≥ V(q)x(q′) − q(q′), ∀q, q′ ∈ [0, 1]. (IC)
V(q)x(q) − p(q) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. (IR)
We call such a menu a lottery pricing. When the lottery pricing is induced in the interim
stage of a multi-agent mechanism, then the constraints above are Bayesian incentive
compatible and interim individual rational, as defined in Chapter 2.
The Myerson [43] characterization of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
applies to lottery pricings and implies that the allocation rule x(·) is monotone non-
decreasing and the payment rule is given precisely as a function of x(·). An important
consequence of the latter part of this characterization is revenue equivalence. We will
make strong usage of both monotonicity and revenue equivalence below, though the
specific form of the payment rule will not be important.
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Constrained Lottery Pricings Given such lottery pricing and a distribution over the
agent’s value, an ex ante expected payment Eq[q(q)] and ex ante probability of service
Eq[x(q)] are induced. The single-agent lottery pricing problem that forms the basis for
the marginal revenue mechanism is the following. Given an ex ante constraint qˆ on the
probability with which the agent is served, find the lottery pricing that serves the agent
with probability qˆ and maximizes revenue.
Definition 4.2.1. The revenue curve R(qˆ) is defined for all qˆ ∈ [0, 1] as the optimal
lottery pricing revenue for ex ante constraint qˆ.
In order to show that convex combinations of optimal ex ante constrained lottery
pricings are optimal in general, we need to consider a more generalized lottery pricing
problem. Notice that the ex ante constraint lottery problem gives an (equality) constraint
on the total probability that the agent is served over all quantiles she may have. To get
more fine-grained control over the lottery pricing we additionally allow upper bounds to
be specified on the total probability of allocation of a subset of quantiles. Consider the
following lottery pricing problem: Given a monotone concave function Xˆ(q), find the
optimal lottery pricing where the ex ante probability of allocating to any qˆ measure of
quantiles is at most Xˆ(qˆ) for all qˆ ∈ [0, 1) and exactly equal to Xˆ(qˆ) at qˆ = 1.
To see why this constrained lottery pricing problem is the right one to consider, no-
tice the following. First, because any allocation rule is monotone, meaning stronger
quantiles receive no lower probability of service than weaker quantiles, the sets of mea-
sure qˆ for which the constraint of service probability at most X(qˆ) is binding correspond
exactly to the strongest qˆ measure of quantiles. For allocation rule x(·) the probability
of service to the strongest qˆ measure of agents is exactly X(qˆ) =
∫ qˆ
0
x(q) dq. We re-
fer to X(·) as the cumulative allocation rule. Thus, the allocation constraint is exactly,
X(qˆ) ≤ Xˆ(qˆ) for all qˆ ∈ [0, 1] (with equality for qˆ = 1).
Of course we can view the cumulative allocation rule X of x as a constraint and
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observe that x satisfies the constraint with equality. Moreover, x is the allocation rule
that satisfies X as a constraint that has the highest probability on stronger (i.e., lower)
quantiles). Therefore, for any constraint Xˆ (with corresponding xˆ(q) = ddq Xˆ(q)) is met by
allocation rule x that relatively has allocation probability shifted from stronger quantiles
to weaker quantiles. Specifically, xˆ majorizes x.
Definition 4.2.2. Rev[xˆ] is the optimal revenue of any lottery pricing that satisfies the
allocation constraint xˆ (via its cumulative allocation rule Xˆ).
Recall our ex ante constrained lottery pricing where we wish to serve the agent
with ex ante probability qˆ. A posted price is parameterized by a single price and is
a simple example of a lottery pricing (i.e., one that is deterministic), the two menu
items are to be served and pay the price or not to be served and pay nothing. The
agent prefers service when her value exceeds the price and, otherwise, she prefers no
service. For an agent with inverse demand curve V(·), the posted price that serves with
probability qˆ is V(qˆ). It gives expected revenue qˆ · V(qˆ) (which is at most R(qˆ)). Its
allocation rule xˆqˆ is the reverse step function that is one on quantiles [0, qˆ] and then zero
on (qˆ, 1]. This rule has the most service probability on strong quantiles of all allocation
rules that satisfy the ex ante allocation constraint. Of course, the revenue it generates
qˆ · V(qˆ) may not be a concave function of qˆ and it must be that the revenue curve R(·)
is concave. It can be shown, in fact, that R(·) is exactly the concave hull of qˆ · V(qˆ)
and the optimal lottery for any qˆ is given by a posted pricing or if R(·) is linear at qˆ
equal to the convex combination of two posted pricings (corresponding to the boundary
of the interval containing qˆ on which R(·) is linear). The allocation rule of this convex
combination is a convex combination of the appropriate two reverse step functions and,
in the sense described above, has service probability shifted from stronger quantiles to
weaker quantiles. This specific form (which is not obvious) is not important for our
rederivation of the optimal mechanism; what is important is that the optimal lotteries
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have weaker allocation rules than posted prices and that the revenue curve is at least the
revenue of posted prices (both of which are obvious).
Revenue Linearity We are now ready to give the new derivation of the marginal rev-
enue mechanism and its revenue optimality. We start with the central definition.
Definition 4.2.3. The single agent lottery pricing problems are revenue linear if Rev[·] is
linear. I.e., the optimal revenue for constraints xˆ = xˆA+xˆB is Rev[xˆ] = Rev[xˆA]+Rev[xˆB].
Now consider the following two lower bounds on the optimal revenue for any allo-
cation constraint xˆ. The constraint xˆ is a monotone non-increasing function. As reverse
step functions provide a basis for such functions, we can view xˆ as a convex combina-
tion of reverse step functions. This convex combination can be sampled by drawing qˆ
at random from the distribution G xˆ with density −xˆ′(q) = ddq xˆ(q) and then posting price
V(qˆ) (and allocation rule xˆqˆ). The allocation rule of the convex combination is exactly
xˆ, its expected revenue lower bounds the optimal revenue subject to the constraint xˆ. A
second approach is to use, instead of the posted pricing V(qˆ), the optimal lottery pricing
for ex ante constraint qˆ. As the allocation rule for each of these mechanisms is weaker
than the corresponding posted pricing allocation rule, the convex combination of the
allocation rules (denote it by x) is weaker than the allocation constraint xˆ. Therefore,
it is feasible for xˆ and its revenue gives a lower bound on the optimal revenue for xˆ.
Formally,
Rev[xˆ] ≥ Eqˆ∼Gqˆ [−xˆ′(qˆ)R(qˆ)]
=
[ − xˆ(qˆ)R(qˆ)]10 + Eq [R′(q)xˆ(q)]
= Eq
[
R′(q)xˆ(q)
]
.
The second equality follows from integration by parts and the third equality from R(1) =
R(0) = 0 (minor assumption: if we always serve or never serve the agent we obtain no
revenue). This construction motivates the following definition.
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Definition 4.2.4. The marginal revenue for an allocation constraint xˆ is MR[xˆ] =
Eq[R′(q)xˆ(q)].
The definition of revenue linearity and the definition of the revenue curve (as the
optimal revenue subject to the ex ante constraint qˆ) immediately imply the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. If the single-agent lottery pricing are revenue linear then the optimal
revenue for an allocation constraint is equal to its marginal revenue, i.e., for all xˆ,
Rev[xˆ] = MR[xˆ].
To show that the marginal revenue is equal to the optimal revenue for single-
dimensional linear preferences, we must only prove revenue linearity. The proof of
this theorem is a simple consequence of revenue equivalence and the simple facts that
the optimal revenue for ex ante constraint qˆ exceeds the posted pricing revenue from
V(qˆ) but it has a weaker allocation rule; however, we defer it to Section A.1.
Theorem 4.2.2. An agent with single-dimensional linear utility is revenue linear.
Corollary 4.2.3. For single-dimensional agents the optimal revenue for an allocation
constraint is equal to its marginal revenue, i.e., for all xˆ, Rev[xˆ] = MR[xˆ].
Multi-agent Mechanisms Our single-agent discussion above is focused on optimiz-
ing revenue from a single-agent subject to an allocation constraint. We now look at
the problem of optimizing expected revenue over agents in a multi-agent mechanism.
The following is the standard argument from auction theory. For each agent, revenue
is given by marginal revenue (Corollary 4.2.3). Relax incentive constraints (namely:
monotonicity of the allocation rule) and optimize marginal revenue pointwise. Mean-
ing, when the agent quantiles are q = (q1, . . . , qn) select the allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn)
to maximize the cumulative marginal revenue
∑
i R′i(qi) · xi subject to feasibility of x
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(e.g., for a single-item auction, serve the agent with the highest positive marginal rev-
enue, or none if the marginal revenues are all negative). Now check that the incentive
constraints hold: Notice that since revenue curves are concave, marginal revenues are
monotone non-increasing, for any agent a stronger (lower) quantile corresponds to a
weakly higher marginal revenue, so the intended allocation rule is monotone. Further-
more, as these allocations optimize marginal revenue pointwise for all profiles of agent
quantiles, they certainly also maximize marginal revenue in expectation over the agent
quantiles.
Comparing the above construction with the marginal revenue mechanism framework
described in the introduction, the missing steps 1 and 4 are simple. For Step 1, the
mapping from value to quantile is given by V−1i (·) for each agent i as described above.
For Step 4, the appropriate payments can be calculated pointwise as follows: Agents that
are not served pay nothing; an agent i that is served pays the value Vi(qˆi) corresponding
to her critical quantile qˆi, i.e., the quantile after which she would no longer served (via
the payment identity).
Theorem 4.2.4. The marginal revenue mechanism is revenue optimal for single-
dimensional linear agents.
4.3 Multi-dimensional and Nonlinear Preferences
In this section we start considering service-based environments that are much more gen-
eral than single-dimensional, linear preferences that have been considered so far.
Bayesian mechanism design An agent has a private type t from type space T drawn
from distribution F with density function f . In this paper we only consider settings
where different agents’ types are drawn independently. The agent may be assigned
outcome w from outcome space W. This outcome encodes what kind of service the agent
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receives and any payments she must make for the service. In particular the payment
specified by an outcome w is denoted by Payment(w). The agent has a von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility function: for type and deterministic outcome w her utility is u(t,w),
and when w is drawn from a distribution her utility is Ew[u(t,w)].2 We will extend the
definition of the utility function to distributions over outcomes ∆(W) linearly. For a
random outcome w from a distribution, Payment(w) will denote the expected payment.
There are n agents indexed {1, . . . , n} and each agent i may have her own distinct
type space Ti, utility function ui, etc. A direct revelation mechanism takes as its inputs
a profile of types t = (t1, . . . , tn), and then outputs for each agent i an outcome w˜i(t).
The ex post outcome rule of the mechanism is w˜i : T1 × · · · × Tn → ∆(Wi). Agent i with
type ti, as the other agents’ types are distributed over T−i, faces an interim outcome rule
w˜i(ti) distributed as w˜i(ti, t−i) with t j ∼ F j for each j , i. We say that a mechanism is
Bayesian incentive compatible if
ui(ti, w˜i(ti)) ≥ ui(ti, w˜i(t′i )), ∀i,∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti. (BIC)
A mechanism is interim individually rational if
ui(ti, w˜i(ti)) ≥ 0, ∀i,∀ti ∈ Ti. (IIR)
The mechanism designer seeks to optimize an objective subject to BIC, IIR,
and ex post feasibility. We consider the objective of expected revenue, i.e.,
Et[
∑
i Payment(w˜i(ti))]; however, any objective that separates linearly across the agents
can be considered. Below we discuss the mechanism’s feasibility constraint.
Service constrained environments In a service constrained environment the outcome
w provided to an agent is distinguished as being a service or non-service outcome, re-
spectively, with Alloc(w) = 1 or Alloc(w) = 0. There is a feasibility constraint restrict-
ing the set of agents that may be simultaneously served; there is no feasibility constraint
2This form of utility function allows for encoding of budgets and risk aversion; we do not require
quasi-linearity.
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on how an agent is served. With respect to the feasibility constraint any outcome w ∈ W
with Alloc(w) = 1 is the same. For example, payments are part of the outcome but are
not constrained by the environment. An agent may have multi-dimensional and non-
linear preferences over distinct service and non-service outcomes.
From least rich to most rich, standard service constrained environments are single-
unit environments where at most one agent can be served, multi-unit environments where
at most a fixed number of agents can be served, matroid environments where the set of
agents served must be the independent set of a given matroid, downward-closed envi-
ronments where the set of agents served can be specified by an arbitrary set systems for
which subsets of a feasible set are feasible, and general environments where the feasible
subsets of agents can be given by an arbitrary set system that may not even be downward
closed.
Downward closure When optimizing revenue subject to a constraint on service prob-
ability, a downward-closed environment always allows the agent to be served with less
often than the constraint desires. To provide a consistent framework that addresses non-
downward closed environments as well, we will require equality of such constraints, but
in downward-closed environments we will modify the outcome space to include each
non-service outcome duplicated with the duplicate relabled as a service outcome. I.e.,
in a downward-closed environment as far as the feasibility constraint is concerned, we
can always say that we served an agent when actually we did not. Such a modification
to the outcome space implies that the revenue from constrained lottery pricing is always
monotone in the constraint. Weaker constraints do not give lower revenue.
Revenue Curves The only aspect of the marginal revenue approach that translates
identically from single-dimensional preferences to general preferences is the definition
of the qˆ ex ante optimal lottery pricing. This is the lottery pricing (i.e., collection of
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outcomes where the agent is permitted to choose her type-dependent favorite) denoted
w˜qˆ(t) with the constraint that Et[Alloc(w˜qˆ(t))] = qˆ that optimizes revenue. For the opti-
mal w˜qˆ(·), the revenue curve for the agent is then given by R(qˆ) = Et[Payment(w˜qˆ(t))] as
per Definition 4.2.1.
Allocation rules Our first challenge, then, in generalizing the marginal revenue ap-
proach to general preferences is that we cannot make an upfront transformation from
the type space T of an agent to a [0, 1] quantile space ordered by the strength of the
agent. E.g., if the type is multi-dimensional then it is unclear which is stronger, a higher
value in one dimension and lower in another or vice versa. In fact, which is stronger
depends on the context, e.g., the competition from other agents.
Our approach is based on two observations. First, relative to a mechanism and for a
particular agent, the relevant part of the mechanism is the (interim) outcome rule w˜(·).
For a given outcome rule w˜(·) an ordering on types by strength can be defined. Simply,
a type that is more likely to be served is stronger than a type that is less likely to be
served. I.e., t is stronger than t′ relative to w˜(·) if Alloc(w˜(t)) ≥ Alloc(w˜(t′)). Second,
(by the above mapping) any outcome rule w˜(·) induces an allocation rule x(·) that maps
quantile to service probability. This allocation rule has a simple intuition in discrete type
spaces: For each type t ∈ T make a rectangle of width equal the probability of the type
f (t) and height equal to the service probability of the type Alloc(w˜(t)). Sort the types
in decreasing order of height; the resulting piecewise constaint function from [0, 1] to
[0, 1] is the allocation rule. This is generalized for continuous distributions as follows.
Definition 4.3.1. For an agent with t ∈ T drawn from distribution F and outcome rule
w˜(·), the allocation rule mapping quantiles to service probabilities is given by x(qˆ) =
sup{x : Prt∼F[Alloc(w˜(t)) ≥ x]}.
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Optimal Lottery Pricing With the definition of allocation rules for any lottery pricing
in hand, allocation constrained lottery pricings generalize naturally. Even though the
order on types may change from one lottery pricing to another, we can still ask for
the lottery pricing with the optimal revenue subject to a constraint on its allocation
rule. The optimal lottery pricing for allocation constraint xˆ with cumulative allocation
constraint Xˆ is given by the outcome rule w˜(·) that optimizes expected revenue subject to
its corresponding allocation rule x with cumulative allocation rule X satisfying X(qˆ) ≤
Xˆ(qˆ) for qˆ ∈ [0, 1] with equality at qˆ = 1. As per Definition 4.2.2 the optimal revenue
for allocation constraint xˆ is denoted Rev[xˆ].
We will generally denote by x the optimal allocation rule for constraint xˆ. The ex
ante constraint on total service probability by qˆ is given by the reverse step function at qˆ
denoted xˆqˆ; the corresponding allocation rule of the qˆ optimal lottery pricing is denoted
xqˆ.
Revenue Linearity and Marginal Revenue Revenue linearity and marginal rev-
enue have the same definitions (Definition 4.2.3 and Definition 4.2.4) as for single-
dimensional preferences. The marginal revenue of an allocation constraint is MR[xˆ] =
Eq[R′(q)xˆ(q)]. By its construction as the revenue of the appropriate convex combina-
tion of ex ante constrained mechanisms it is a lower bound on the optimal revenue, i.e.,
Rev[xˆ] ≥ MR[xˆ]. Again by its construction, revenue linearity would imply it is equal to
the optimal revenue.
There is nothing special about revenue curves for agents with general preferences
over those for single-dimensional preferences. Given any revenue curve for a general
agent, we can construct a single-dimensional agent with the exact same revenue curve.
Theorem 4.2.4 shows that marginal revenue maximization is optimal for this single-
dimensional analog.
Definition 4.3.2. The optimal marginal revenue for a service constrained environment
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with general agent preferences is the expected revenue (equal to marginal revenue) of
the single-dimensional analog with each agent replaced by a single dimensional agent
with the same revenue curve.
The framework thus defined affords two very natural questions. First, as for gen-
eral preferences revenue may be strictly larger than marginal revenue, does the optimal
marginal revenue approximate the optimal revenue? Second, as the implementation of
the marginal revenue mechanism for single-dimensional preferences does not directly
extend to general preferences (e.g., Steps 1 and 4), can we implement the marginal rev-
enue mechanisms? In the remainder of this section we will focus on the revenue-linear
special case, where the optimal revenue is the optimal marginal revenue, and we will
answer the implementation question. Non-revenue-linear environments are considered
in the next sections.
Implementation with Revenue Linearity We show now that the marginal revenue
mechanism generalizes exactly for general preferences that satisfy revenue linearity.
Moreover, in this case the marginal revenue mechanism inherits all of the nice proper-
ties of the marginal revenue mechanism for single-dimensional preferences. Namely,
it deterministically selects the set of agents to serve, it is dominant strategy incentive
compatible (truthful reporting is a best response for any actions of the other agents), and
the mapping from types to quantiles to marginal revenues is deterministic and context
free3 in that it does not depend on the feasibility constraint or other agents in the mech-
anism. The mechanism, however, is optimal among the larger class of randomized and
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. As motivation for this result, we will show
subsequently that there are multi-dimensional preferences that are revenue linear, e.g.,
3Note that this contrasts with recent algorithmic work in multi-dimensional optimal mechanism design
where the optimal mechanism is characterized by mapping types stochastically to “virtual values” and this
mapping is solved for from the feasibility constraint and the distributions of all agents types. See Alaei
et al. [1] and Cai et al. [11, 12].
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when multi-dimensional values are uniformly distributed on a hypercube.
The main challenge of implementing the marginal revenue mechanism is in speci-
fying Step 1, i.e., the mapping from types to quantiles, and Step 4, i.e., selecting the
appropriate outcomes for the set of agents that are served. If, however, each agent’s
types are orderable by the following definition, then both steps are essentially identical
to the single-dimensional case.
Definition 4.3.3. A single-agent problem is orderable if there is an equivalence relation
on the types, and there is an ordering on the equivalence classes, such that for any
allocation constraint xˆ, the optimal outcome rule w˜ induces an allocation rule that is
greedy by this ordering with ties between types in a same equivalence class broken
uniformly at random.4
Orderability may look like a stringent and unlikely condition to hold generally. We
note that it holds for single-dimensional agents and we show, more generally, it is a
consequence of revenue linearity.
Theorem 4.3.1. For any single-agent problem, revenue linearity implies orderability.
The theorem is proved by the following two lemmas which characterize the structure
of optimal lottery pricings; their proofs can be found in Section A.2.
Lemma 4.3.2. For a revenue-linear single-agent problem, let x be the optimal allocation
rule subject to some constraint xˆ. Then, for any qˆ such that R′′(qˆ) , 0 we have X(qˆ) =
Xˆ(qˆ).
Lemma 4.3.2 in particular implies that for qˆ with R′′(qˆ) , 0 the qˆ-constrained lottery
pricing (i.e., with allocation constraint given by the reverse step function xˆqˆ) has alloca-
4By greedy by the given ordering, we mean process each equivalance class in order and serve the
corresponding types with as much probability as possible subject to the allocation constraint. As a con-
sequence, given any prefix of the equivalance classes on types of measure qˆ (according to the distribution
on types), the allocation constraint imposed by xˆ is binding. If all equivalance classes are measure zero,
then resulting allocation rule is equal to the allocation constraint.
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tion rule xqˆ = xˆqˆ. I.e., the qˆ lottery pricing has only full lotteries (all types are served
with either probability one or zero).
For any such qˆ, define Tq to be the set of types allocated (with full lotteries) in the
optimal allocation subject to xˆqˆ. The following lemma shows that these sets are nested.
Lemma 4.3.3. For a revenue-linear single-agent problem, for any qˆ1 > qˆ2 and
R′′(qˆ1),R′′(qˆ2) , 0, we must have Tqˆ1 ⊇ Tqˆ2 .
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1. By Lemma 4.3.3, all qˆ optimal lottery pricings order the types
by the same equivalance classes. By revenue linearity the optimal lottery pricing for
an allocation constraint xˆ is a convex combination of the qˆ optimal lottery pricings.
Therefore, it allocates greedily to types by the same equivalance classes. 
Given orderability and the fact that (by Lemma 4.3.2) the optimal qˆ-constrained
lottery pricings are full lotteries for qˆ for which R(qˆ) is locally linear, the marginal
revenue mechanism is easy to define.
Definition 4.3.4. The marginal revenue mechanism for orderable agents works as fol-
lows.
(a) Map reported types t = (t1, . . . , tn) of agents to quantiles q = (q1, . . . , qn) via the
implied ordering.5
(b) Calculate the marginal revenue of each agent i as R′i(qi).
(c) For each agent i, calculate the maximum quantile qˆi that she could possess and be
in the marginal revenue maximizing feasible set (breaking ties consistently).
(d) Offer each agent i the qˆi optimal lottery pricing.
Proposition 4.3.4. The marginal revenue mechanism deterministically selects a feasible
set of agents to serve and is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
5This ordering can be found by calculating the optimal single-agent mechanism for allocation con-
straint xˆ(q) = 1 − q.
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Proof. Because ties are broken consistently, critical values cannot fall in intervals where
the revenue curve is locally linear (and the marginal revenue curve is locally constant).
Therefore, the lottery pricings offered to each agent are full lotteries; each type is de-
terministically served or not served. Feasibility follows as the set of agents that select
service outcomes is exactly the marginal revenue maximizing set subject to feasibility.
To verify the dominant strategy incentive compatibility consider any agent i’s perspec-
tive. The parameter qˆi is a function only of the other agents’ reports; the agent’s outcome
is determined by the qˆi optimal lottery which is incentive compatible for any qˆi. 
Proposition 4.3.5. In service constrained environment with revenue-linear agents, the
marginal revenue mechanism obtains the optimal marginal revenue (which equals the
optimal revenue).
A multi-dimensional revenue-linear example The example of the seller who can
paint her car red or blue as she sells it to agents with independent and uniform val-
ues for each color is revenue linear (proof given in Section A.3). Therefore, the
marginal revenue mechanism is optimal and its simple form can be derived from Def-
inition 4.3.4 as follows. For an unit-demand agent with values for m variants of a ser-
vice (i.e., possible colors of the car) distributed uniformly on [0, 1]m, the quantile of
each type t = (t1, . . . , tm) is q = 1 − (maxi ti)m, i.e., the probability she has the max-
imum value over all kinds of services. The revenue function is R(q) = q m
√
1 − q if
q ≤ mm+1 , and m(m + 1)−(1/m+1) otherwise. The marginal revenue function is R′(q) =
m(1 − q)1/m−1(m − (m + 1)q) if q ≤ mm+1 and R′(q) = 0 otherwise. Notice that both the
mapping and the marginal revenue function are monotone. Therefore serving the agent
with the highest marginal revenue (Definition 4.3.4) means serving the player with the
highest value for any kind of service and charging her the minimum she needs to bid
to exceed the second-highest value (subject to the reserve of m
√
1
m+1 which is where the
marginal revenue becomes zero).
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4.4 Implementation
The marginal revenue mechanism (Definition 4.3.4) for agents with orderable types
does not extend to general agents. In this section we give two approaches for defin-
ing the marginal revenue mechanism more generally. The first approach assumes that
the parameterized family of qˆ-constrained lottery pricing satisfy a natural monotonicity
requirement: that the probability that an agent with a given type is served is monotone
in qˆ. Like the marginal revenue mechanism for orderable agents, this mechanism is
dominant strategy incentive compatible. Unlike the marginal revenue mechanism for
orderable agents, this mechanism does not deterministically select a set of agents to
serve. The second approach is brute-force but easily computable and completely gen-
eral. It results in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. These two mechanisms
will differ from the marginal revenue mechanism for orderable types only in the first
(mapping types to quantiles) and last (serving each agent if her quantile is at most her
critical quantile) steps; these changes can be mix-and-matched for different agents in
the same mechanism.
Marginal revenue maximization for given revenue curves and feasibility constraint
induces a profile of normalized interim allocation rules via the following simulation:
Draw agent quantiles uniformly from [0, 1]; calculate the marginal revenues for each
agent; serve the set of agents to maximize the marginal revenue. This simulation gives
rise to the profile of normalized interim allocation rules that maximize marginal rev-
enue in expectation. Denote these interim allocation rules by xˆMR1 , . . . , xˆ
MR
n . Any real
mechanism that maximizes marginal revenue should look to each agent i like sampling
a qˆ-constrained lottery pricing with density − ddqˆ xˆMRi (qˆ). The outcome rule of this con-
vex combination for agent i is given by: w˜MRi (ti) = −
∫ 1
0
w˜qˆ(ti) dxˆMRi (qˆ) where w˜
qˆ is the
outcome rule for the qˆ-step mechanism. Our goal in this section is to find the multi-
agent mechanism that induces these interim outcome rules w˜MR1 , . . . , w˜
MR
n and is ex post
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feasible.
We conclude this section by describing a relevant class of agents for which the ex
ante constrained lottery pricing satisfy the monotonicity property required by the first
approach of this section. The example is one of a single-dimensional agent with a public
budget.
4.4.1 Monotone Ex Ante Constrained Lottery Pricings
We define below a simple extension of the marginal revenue mechanism for orderable
types for the case where the single-agent step mechanisms satisfy a natural monotonicity
property. The resulting mechanism is based on a randomized mapping from types to
quantiles that is independent across the agents.
Definition 4.4.1. An agent has monotone ex ante constrained lottery pricing if, given
her type, the probability she wins in the qˆ-constrained lottery pricingMq is monotone
non-decreasing in qˆ.
Suppose that the qˆ-constrained lottery pricing Mq for an agent each consist of a
menu of full lotteries. I.e., for any type of the agent she will choose a lottery that either
serves her with probability 1 or zero. In this case the monotone ex ante constrained
lottery pricing assumption would require that the sets of types served for each qˆ are
nested. There is a simple deterministic mapping from types to quantiles in this case: set
the quantile of a type to be the minimum qˆ such that the qˆ-constrained lottery pricing
serves the type. Below, we generalize this selection procedure to the case of partial
lotteries (where types may be probabilistically served or not).
Recall that the qˆ-constrained lottery pricing Mq has allocation rule x˜qˆ that maps
types to probability of service. Fix the type of the agent as t and consider the func-
tion Gt(q) = x˜qˆ(t) which, by the monotonicity condition above, can be interpreted as
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a cumulative distribution function. Notice that Mq has ex ante probability of service
Et[x˜qˆ(t)] = qˆ. Therefore, if t is drawn from the type distribution and then q is drawn
from Gt then the distribution of q is uniform on [0, 1].
Lemma 4.4.1. If t ∼ F and q ∼ Gt then q is U[0, 1].
Definition 4.4.2. The marginal revenue mechanism for agents with monotone step
mechanisms works as follows.
(a) Map reported types t = (t1, . . . , tn) of agents to quantiles q = (q1, . . . , qn) by sam-
pling qi from the distribution with cumulative distribution function Gti(q) = x˜
qˆ
i (ti).
(b) Calculate the marginal revenue of each agent i as R′i(qi).
(c) For each agent i, calculate the maximum quantile q∗i that she could possess and be
in the marginal revenue maximizing feasible set (breaking ties consistently).
(d) For each agent i, offer the mechanismMqˆ∗ii conditioned so that i is served if qi ≤ q∗i
and not served otherwise.
The last step of the marginal revenue mechanism warrants an explanation. In the
qˆ∗i -constrained lottery pricingMqˆ
∗
i
i , the outcome that i would obtain with type ti may be a
partial lottery, i.e., it may probabilistically serve i or not. The probability that i is served
is x˜qˆ
∗
i
i (ti) = Prqi[qi ≤ q∗i ] by our choice of qi. When we offer agent i the mechanism
Mqˆ∗ii we must draw an outcome from the distribution given by w˜qˆ
∗
i
i (ti). Some of these
outcomes are service outcomes, some of these are non-service outcomes. If qi ≤ q∗i then
we draw an outcome from the distribution w˜qˆ
∗
i
i (ti) conditioned on service; if qi > q
∗
i then
we draw an outcome conditioned on no-service. Notice that it may not be feasible to
serve all agents who receive non-trivial partial lottery. This method coordinates across
the partial lotteries which agents to serve to maintain the right distribution on agent
outcomes and ensure feasibility.
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Proposition 4.4.2. The marginal revenue mechanism for agents with monotone step
mechanisms is feasible and dominant strategy incentive compatible.
Proof. Feasibility follows as the set of agents that select service outcomes is exactly
the marginal revenue maximizing set subject to feasibility. To verify the dominant strat-
egy incentive compatibility consider any agent i’s perspective. The parameter q∗i is a
function only of the other agents’ reports; the agent’s outcome is determined by the
qˆ∗i -constrained lottery pricingMqˆ
∗
i
i which is incentive compatible for any q
∗
i . 
Theorem 4.4.3. The marginal revenue mechanism for agents with monotone step mech-
anisms implements marginal revenue maximization.
Proof. From each agent i’s perspective, the other agents’ quantiles are distributed inde-
pendently and uniformly on [0, 1] (Lemma 4.4.1). Therefore, this agent faces a distribu-
tion over ex ante constrained lottery pricing that is identical to the distribution of “critical
quantiles” in the maximization of marginal revenue, i.e., with density − ddqˆ xˆMR(qˆ). 
4.4.2 General Ex Ante Constrained Lottery Pricings
For general agents for whom the ex ante constrained lottery pricings do not satisfy the
monotonicity condition (Definition 4.4.1), we give in Section A.4 an efficiently imple-
mentable procedure to extract the optimal marginal revenue (recall Definition 4.3.2).
The key to the proof of Theorem 4.4.4 is a variation of the technique of vector majoriza-
tion [30].
Theorem 4.4.4. For downward-closed service constrained environments, the opti-
mal marginal revenue can be efficiently extracted by a Bayesian incentive compatible
marginal revenue mechanism (see Definition A.4.2).
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4.5 Approximation
In previous sections, we have shown that for any collection of agents the marginal rev-
enue mechanism can be implemented. We know that for context-free agents, this ex-
tracts the optimal revenue. In this section, we show that this revenue is a good approxi-
mation to the optimal revenue quite generally.
We will give two approaches for approximation bounds. The first kind of bound
is based on the single-agent problem, i.e., the distribution and type space. If we can
show that for all allocation constraints, the marginal revenue is a good approximation
to the optimal revenue, then the marginal revenue mechanism is a good approximation
to the optimal mechanism. The second approach will derive bounds from the feasibility
constraint. Clearly, with no feasibility constraint, marginal revenue maximization is
optimal. We will show that for matroid environments, it gives a 1 − 1/e approximation,
and for general downward-closed environments, it gives a O(log n) approximation.
Of course, if we are in an environment where our agent-based arguments imply
an α-approximation and our feasibility-based arguments imply a β-approximation, the
marginal revenue mechanism is in fact a min(α, β)-approximation. In context-free en-
vironments α = 1 (and marginal revenue is optimal); the approximation smoothly de-
grades in α as the environment becomes less revenue linear until it reaches the approxi-
mation bound β given by the feasibility constraint.
4.5.1 Agent-based Approximation
If, for all allocation rules, the marginal revenue is close to the optimal revenue, then
marginal revenue maximization is approximately optimal. One approach to deriving
such a bound is to give a linear upper bound on the optimal revenue and a lower bound
through a class of pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricings. A pseudo step mechanism
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respects a step constraint but may not be optimal. If for every quantile qˆ the pseudo qˆ-
constrained lottery pricing approximates the linear upper bound, then marginal revenue
maximization approximates the optimal revenue for all allocation constraints. Further-
more, these pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricings can be directly optimized over
and the same approximation factor is obtained. Such an approach might be desirable if
the pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricings are better-behaved than the (optimal) ex
ante constrained lottery pricings, e.g., if they are easy to compute, respect an ordering
on types, or are step monotone.
This approach is formalized by the following sequence of definitions and proposi-
tions.
Proposition 4.5.1. If for any agent i and allocation rule xi, the marginal revenue MR(xi)
is at least an α fraction of the optimal revenue Rev(xi), then the marginal revenue mech-
anism in the multi-agent setting is an α-approximation to the optimal mechanism.
Definition 4.5.1. A linear revenue bound, UB, is a function mapping an allocation con-
straint to a revenue, which is
• linear in the allocation constraint, i.e., for all allocation constraints xˆa and xˆb and
γ ∈ [0, 1], UB(γxˆa + (1 − γ)xˆb) = γUB(xˆa) + (1 − γ) UB(xˆb).
• an upper bound on revenue for all allocation constraints, i.e., ∀xˆ, UB(xˆ) ≥ Rev(xˆ),
and
Definition 4.5.2. A pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing is one that respects a step
constraint but is not necessarily revenue optimal for such a constraint. The revenue of
the pseudo qˆ-constrained lottery pricing M˜q is denoted R˜(qˆ); and the pseudo marginal
revenue for allocation constraint xˆ is PMR(xˆ) = E[R˜′(qˆ)xˆ(qˆ)].
We can assume without loss of generality that the pseudo marginal revenue R˜ is
concave. If it is not we could always redefine the class by taking its closure with re-
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spect to convex combination and letting the pseudo qˆ-constrained lottery pricing be the
revenue-optimal mechanism in the class that serves with ex ante probability qˆ.
Proposition 4.5.2. For a given linear revenue bound UB, if for all qˆ the pseudo qˆ-
constrained lottery pricing α-approximates the bound on the qˆ-step constraint UB(xˆqˆ),
then the pseudo marginal revenue α-approximates the optimal revenue for all allocation
constraints.
Proof. This proposition follows from linearity of both the revenue bound and pseudo
marginal revenue. 
Definition 4.5.3. The pseudo marginal revenue mechanism is the one that maximizes
pseudo marginal revenue via any of the approaches of Definition 4.3.4, Definition 4.4.2,
or Definition A.4.2 that applies.
Pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing for downward-closed unit-demand
agents For clarity with respect to the literature we will refer to this agent as being
unit-demand and the types of services as being distinct items. Without an allocation con-
straint, this problem has seen extensive studied. Briest et al. [8] show that the optimal
lottery pricing can be calculated by a linear program that has size equal to the number
of distinct types of the agents. When the agent’s value for the items are independently
distributed, Cai and Daskalakis [10] give a dynamic program for approximating the op-
timal item pricing to within a (1 + ) factor for any  in time polynomial in the number
of items. These results are distinct in two ways. First, the first result is optimal with
respect to randomized mechanisms whereas the second is (nearly) optimal with respect
to deterministic mechanisms. Second, the first result would require time exponential in
the number of items for a product distribution, while the second result is polynomial
(but requires a product distribution). It is not known whether the optimal lottery pricing
for product distributions can be calculated arbitrarily closely in polynomial time in the
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number of items. (Recently, Daskalakis et al. [20] showed that it is #P-hard to calculate
the exactly optimal lottery pricing in this scenario.) Attempting to address this question,
a combination of the work of Chawla et al. [16, 15] shows that for product distributions,
item pricing is a 4-approximation to lottery pricing. Furthermore, there is an item pric-
ing that is very simple to describe that satisfies this bound. We generalize this theory
to single-agent problems with a supply constraint xˆ and use it to give a 4-approximate
class of pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing for unit-demand, downward-closed
agents.
Consider the syntactically-related problem of selling a single item to one of m single-
dimensional agents with values drawn from a product distribution, i.e., the value vi of
agent i is drawn independently from Fi. As described earlier, the optimal auction for
this single-dimensional problem is well understood. Agent values are mapped to virtual
values (equivalent to each agent’s marginal revenue), and the agent with the highest
positive virtual value is selected as the winner of the auction. We refer to this auction
environment as the single-dimensional representative environment, the revenue obtained
by the optimal auction as the optimal representative revenue, and the agents participating
in the auction as representatives.
Notice that if these representatives were all colluding together the problem would be
identical to our original single-agent unit-demand problem. We refer to this environment
as the unit-demand environment and the revenue of the optimal lottery pricing as the op-
timal unit-demand revenue. The approach of Chawla et al. [16] is to try to mimic the
outcome of the optimal auction for the representative environment to obtain an approx-
imately optimal pricing in the unit-demand environment. As the optimal auction in the
representative environment orders representatives by virtual value, a natural approach
to pricing the items in the unit-demand environment is to set a uniform virtual price,
i.e., the price for each item has the same virtual value (with respect to the distribution
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from which the agent’s value for that item is drawn).6 Chawla et al. [16] show that the
unit-demand revenue of such a pricing is a 2-approximation to the optimal representa-
tive revenue; Chawla et al. [15] show that the optimal unit-demand revenue (e.g., from
lottery pricings) is at most twice the optimal representative revenue. Combining these
two results, uniform virtual pricing is a 4-approximation to the optimal unit-demand
revenue.
We generalize the approach above to single-agent problem of serving an agent with
independent values for m items subject to an allocation constraint xˆ. In particular,
twice the optimal representative revenue is a linear revenue bound (Definition 4.5.1),and
we define a class of pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing where the pseudo qˆ-
constrained lottery pricing is given by a uniform virtual pricing that sells with prob-
ability qˆ. Since the virtual values are weakly increasing in the representative agents’
values, the sets of types served by these pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing are
nested. Therefore, the pseudo marginal revenue mechanism can be implemented via the
marginal revenue mechanism for orderable agents (Definition 4.3.4). Finally, we show
that for all qˆ the pseudo qˆ-constrained lottery pricing is a 4-approximation to the linear
upper bound given by twice the optimal representative revenue. This result with Propo-
sition 4.5.2 implies that the pseudo marginal revenue mechanism is a 4-approximation
to the optimal revenue. The proof of Theorem 4.5.3, below, is a rather straightforward
extension of Chawla et al. [16, 15] and we include it in Section A.5.
Definition 4.5.4. The pseudo qˆ-constrained lottery pricing for a unit-demand agent with
values for items drawn independently from F1, . . . , Fn is given by the pricing that sets a
uniform virtual price for the items such that the probability that the agent buys any item
is equal to qˆ. (If this class does not have a monotone non-decreasing pseudo revenue
6As mentioned above, a representative’s virtual value is equal to their marginal revenue. For clarity
of discussion and to disambiguate the marginal revenue of the unit demand agent versus that of her
representatives we will refer to the representative marginal revenue as virtual value.
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curve R˜(·) we invoke downward closure to make it monotone; if this class does not have
a concave pseudo revenue curve we take its closure with respect to convex combination
to make it concave.)
Theorem 4.5.3. In downward-closed (service constrained) environments with unit-
demand agents, both the pseudo marginal revenue mechanism and the marginal revenue
mechanisms are a 4-approximation to the optimal revenue.
4.5.2 Feasibility-based Approximation
We now show that the feasibility constraint implies an approximation bound as well.
As a first simple bound, if there is no feasibility constraint (e.g., for digital goods) then
marginal revenue maximization is optimal. Below we give a e/(e − 1) approximation
bound for matroid environments, and, for n linear-utility agents, an O(log n) bound for
downward-closed environments.
Matroid environments Marginal revenue maximization is an e/(e−1) approximation
when the feasibility constraint is induced by independent sets of a matroid set system.
This same approximation factor governs single-item auctions. For k-unit environments
we obtain a 1/(1 − (2pik)−1/2)-approximation. These results follow from the correlation
gap approach of Yan [56].
Theorem 4.5.4. In a matroid environment the optimal marginal revenue is a e/(e − 1)-
approximation to the optimal revenue; for k-unit environments it is a 1/(1 − (2pik)−1/2)-
approximation.
Proof sketch. Suppose the optimal mechanism serves agent i with ex ante probability
qˆ∗i . Relax the feasibility constraints and consider maximizing revenue subject to ex
ante probability qˆ∗i for each agent i. This revenue is only greater and it is precisely
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∑
i Ri(qˆ∗i ). Sort agents by Ri(qˆ
∗
i )/qˆ
∗
i , i.e., bang-per-buck, and run the greedy matroid
algorithm: if it is possible to serve i when i is visited by the algorithm, then offer i the
qˆ∗i -constrained lottery pricing Mqˆ∗i (by definition, the optimal mechanism that serves
with ex ante probability qˆ∗i ). It follows immediately from the main theorem of Yan [56]
is that this is an e/(e − 1)-approximation for general matroids and an 1/(1 − (2pik)−1/2)-
approximation for k-uniform matroids. This greedy-based mechanism’s revenue is given
by its marginal revenue, and therefore the marginal revenue maximizer is only better. 
Downward-closed environments In this section we show that in downward-closed
environments where the agents have linear utilities, the optimal marginal revenue is a
logarithmic approximation, in the number of agents, to the optimal revenue.
The intuition for the proof is as follows. If we consider allocation constraints with
a minimum probability of allocating to any type of 2−K , then the allocation constraint
can be partitioned into K pieces with the highest and lowest probability of allocation
within each piece being within a factor of two of each other. The revenue of each piece
can be approximated by a qˆ-constraint scaled appropriately so that it is dominated by the
original allocation constraint. (In order for the revenue of the qˆ-constraint lottery pricing
to scale appropriately, we need the agent to have linear utility.) The total revenue is then
at most an O(K)-fraction of the revenue of the best such scaled step constraint. We will
be able to restrict attention to allocation constraints with K ≈ log n.
We start by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.5. For an agent with linear utility, any allocation constraint with minimum
probability xˆ(1) ≥ 2−K has revenue at most 2K MR(xˆ).
Proof. Let R∗ = Rev(xˆ) be the optimal revenue for allocation constraint xˆ. Define
sequence of quantiles 0 = q0 ≤ q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qK = 1 such that x(q j−1) ≤ 2x(q j). Define R∗j
to be the expected revenue from types that are mapped to a quantile in [q j−1, q j], where
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quantile of a type is the probability that a type drawn at random has a higher probability
of service. Therefore, the revenue of the mechanism is R∗ =
∑K
j=1 R
∗
j. Then there must
exist j∗ such that R∗ ≤ KR∗j∗ . In what follows, we define normalized allocation rules
z j(·) for all j, such that z j  x, and also R∗j ≤ 2 MR(z j). In particular, for j∗ we will have
z j∗  x, and 2 MR(z j∗) ≥ R∗j∗ ≥ R∗/K. This implies that
2 maxzx MR(z) ≥ 2 MR(z j∗) ≥ R∗/K.
Define function z j(·) to be z j(q) = x(qi+1) if q ≤ qi+1 − qi, and 0 otherwise. Notice
that for any q, we have z j(q) ≤ x(q), and therefore z j  x, by the definition of dominance
in downward-closed environments.
We now show that for z j defined above, R∗j ≤ 2 MR(z j). By construction of z j, and
recalling that x(q j) ≤ 2x(q j+1),
2 MR(z j) = 2
∫ 1
0
z j(q)R′(q)dq
= 2x(q j+1)R(q j+1 − q j)
≥ x(q j)R(q j+1 − q j)
It is therefore sufficient to show that x(q j)R(q j+1 − q j) ≥ R∗j. Recall that R∗j is the
revenue from types that are mapped to quantiles in [q j, q j+1]. Any type in [q j, q j+1] is
allocated in x with probability at most x(q j). Now define the set of lotteries L to be the
lotteries chosen by types in [q j, q j+1], and offer them to the agent 7. Notice that types in
[q j, q j+1] choose the same lottery in L as they did in x. As a result, the measure of the
types that choose some lottery in L is at least q j+1 − q j. Now remove lotteries from L,
from the one with lowest price, until the measure of types that choose some lottery is
exactly q j+1 − q j. Call this new set of lotteries L′. Notice that the revenue from L′ is at
least R∗j. Now recall that all the lotteries in L, and therefore L
′, allocate with probability
7By the taxation principle, any incentive compatible mechanism consists of a set of lotteries, from
which the agent chooses the one maximizing her utility.
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at most x(q j). So it is feasible to define a new set of lotteries L′′ to be the lotteries in L′
scaled up by 1/x(q j) 8 As the agent has linear utility, from L′′ each type would choose
her favorite lottery in L′ scaled up by 1/x(q j). The revenue from L′′ is therefore at least
R∗j/x(q j). Since a fraction q j+1 − q j of types buy some lottery in L′′, by definition the
revenue that we get is at most R(q j+1 − q j). We conclude that R∗j/x(q j) ≤ R(q j+1 − q j).
To complete the proof, recall that for downward-closed environments revenue curves
are monotone non-decreasing so marginal revenues are non-negative. Therefore, by the
definition of marginal revenue and dominance, MR(xˆ) ≥ MR(z j) for all j. 
Theorem 4.5.6. In downward-closed environments with n linear-utility agents, the op-
timal marginal revenue is a 4 log n-approximation to the optimal revenue.
Poorf of Theorem 4.5.6. Consider an alternative mechanism that runs the optimal mech-
anism with probability 1/2, and otherwise picks an agent at random and outputs an arbi-
trary outcome that services that agent, regardless of his type and without charging him.
The revenue of the alternative mechanism is half the revenue of the optimal revenue. Let
x1, . . . , xn be the allocation rules for the alternative mechanism. Notice also that by con-
struction of the alternative mechanism, for each i and q ∈ [0, 1] we have xi(q) ≥ 1/2n.
Therefore we can invoke Lemma 4.5.5 with K = log 2n to conculde that that the revenue
of the alternative mechanism is at most
2 log n
∑
i
MRi(xi). 
8A lottery is said to be scaled up by a factor of α if its price and the probability of each of the service
offered is multiplied by α.
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4.6 Extending Techniques From Single-Dimensional Linear Utility
Settings
The marginal revenue approach allows natural generalizations of techniques developed
in the single-dimensional settings. These techniques include simple reserve price based
mechanisms and prior-independent mechanisms. Theorem 4.5.3, for example, can be
naturally combined with such techniques.
Example 4.6.1. For the environment of linear-utility unit demand agents, if, for each
agent, her valuation for each item is i.i.d. drawn from a regular distribution (whereas
different agents’ distributions are allowed to be different), the pseudo ex ante contrained
lottery pricings (Definition 4.5.4) for each agent is a fixed price on all items, allowing
the agent to choose her favorite one. Any mechanism, certainly including the pseudo
marginal revenue mechanism, that is the convex combination of such lottery pricings
can effectively reduce the type of an agent to the highest value she holds for any item.
This allows the following generalization of results from the single-dimension literature:
Simple vs. Optimal Combining Theorem 4.5.3 and techniques in Hartline and Rough-
garden [32], in matroid settings, the revenue of the VCG mechanism with an
anonymous reserve price on all services is a 16-approximation to the optimal rev-
enue; if the reserve prices for each agent are set to the optimal prices used in a
single-agent pricing problem, the VCG mechanism is an 8-approximation.
Prior-Independent Mechanisms via Single Sampling Combining Theorem 4.5.3 and
techniques in Dhangwatnotai et al. [21], in matroid settings, if for each agent there
is κ other ones with the same valuation distribution, then in the VCG auction one
can randomly choose one of them, using her highest value among the services as
a reserve price for the others, to obtain a prior-independent (since no prior infor-
mation is used in this mechanism) 8 · κ
κ−1 -approximation to the optimal revenue.
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As another example, for agents whose valuations for different services are drawn
independently from (not necessarily identical) regular distributions, one can define an-
other set of pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricing differently from Definition 4.5.4,
wherein for each qˆ ∈ [0, 1], there is a uniform price on all services and the agent may
choose whichever she likes. Using techniques similar to those in Section A.5, one can
show that this set of lottery prices 8-approximates the linear upper bound developed in
Lemma A.5.1. This again allows one to reduce the type of an agent to her highest value
among all services, and the generalizations listed in Example 4.6.1 translate easily. In
particular, we obtain:
Theorem 4.6.1. In multi-service linear utility environments, when each agents’ values
for the services are drawn independently from regular distributions, the VCG mechanism
with an anonymous reserve price on all services is a 32-approximation to the optimal
revenue.
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULTAENOUS ITEM AUCTIONS
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we have mainly considered the design of revenue-optimal, incentive
compatible mechanisms. Another central problem in algorithmic mechanism design
is to determine how best to allocate resources among individuals to maximize social
welfare. Much of the theoretical work in this field to date has focused on solving such
problems also via incentive compatible mechanisms. Such an approach has theoretical
appeal, but incentive compatible mechanisms with good welfare warranties, e.g. the
VCG auctions, tend to be complex and are rarely used in practice. Instead, it is common
to forego incentive compatibility and use simpler mechanisms. Canonical examples of
such auctions are the generalized second price (GSP) auctions for online advertising [23,
53], and the ascending price auction for electromagnetic spectrum allocation [42]. Given
that such simple auctions are used in practice, it is of crucial importance to determine
how they actually perform when used by rational agents.
Consider the problem of resolving a combinatorial auction. In such a problem there
is a large set M of m objects for sale, and n potential buyers. Each buyer has a pri-
vate value function vi : 2M → R≥0 mapping sets of objects to their associated values.
The goal of the market designer is to decide how to allocate the objects among the
buyers to maximize the overall social efficiency. One approach would be to elicit the
valuation function from each bidder, then attempt to solve the resulting optimization
problem. However, the valuation function is an object of exponential size, and this ap-
proach leads inevitably to large communication and computation complexity overheads.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in existing online marketplaces such as eBay, buy-
ers do not express their (potentially complex) preferences directly; rather, each item is
68
auctioned independently, and a buyer is forced to bid separately on individual items.
This approach is simple and natural, and relieves the burden of expressing a potentially
complex valuation function. On the other hand, this limited expressiveness could poten-
tially lead to inefficient outcomes. This begs the question: how well does the outcome
of simultaneous item auctions approximate the socially optimal allocation?
In order to evaluate the performance of non-truthful mechanisms, we take the eco-
nomic viewpoint that self-interested agents will apply bidding strategies at equilibrium,
so that no agent can unilaterally improve his outcome by changing his strategy. We
apply a quantitative approach, and ask how well the performance at equilibrium approx-
imates the socially optimal outcome. Since there may potentially be multiple equilibria,
we will bound the performance in the worst case over equilibria. Put another way, our
approach is to use the price of anarchy as a performance measure for the analysis of
mechanisms.
The fact that equilibria of simultaneous auctions might not be socially optimal was
first observed by Bikhchandani [7], who studied the complete information1 setting. As
he states:
“Simultaneous sealed bid auctions are likely to be inefficient under com-
plete information and hence, also under the more realistic assumption of
incomplete information about buyer reservation values.”
Our goal is to bound the extent of this inefficiency in the incomplete information setting.
To this end, we model incomplete information using the standard Bayesian framework,
as we have done in previous chapters. Again we will assume that the agents’ valu-
ations/types are independently drawn from distributions. This product distribution is
commonly known to all of the participants; we think of this as representing the public’s
aggregate beliefs about the buyers in the market. While the distributions are common
1In a complete (or full) information setting, it is assumed that the bidders’ valuations are commonly
known to all participants
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knowledge, each agent’s true valuation is private. This Bayesian model generalizes the
full-information model of Nash equilibrium, which implicitly supposes that the type
profile is known by all participants. Note that while the agents are aware of the type dis-
tribution, the mechanism (which applies simultaneous item auctions) is prior-free and
hence agnostic to this information.
Pricing and Efficiency in Simultaneous Auctions We consider separately the case
in which items are sold via first-price auctions (in which the player who bids highest
wins and pays his bid), and the case of second-price auctions2 (in which the winning
bidder pays the second-highest bid). The differences between first and second-price
simultaneous auctions have received significant attention in the recent literature. For ex-
ample, a pure Nash equilibrium of our mechanism with simultaneous first-price auctions
is equivalent to a Walrasian equilibrium [7, 34], and therefore must obtain the optimal
social welfare [40]. On the other hand, every pure Nash equilibrium for simultaneous
second-price auctions is equivalent to a Conditional equilibrium, and hence obtains at
least half of the optimal social welfare [27]. While these constant factor bounds are
appealing, their power is marred by the fact that pure equilibria do not exist in general.
In fact, based on the equivalence results above, their existence is quite restrictive (e.g.,
for simultaneous first-price auctions, existence is guaranteed for an extremely restrictive
family of valuations, called gross substitutes [29]). Moreover, pure Nash equilibria rely
on the very strong assumption of full information, which is rare in practice.
Can we hope for such constant-factor bounds to hold for general Bayes-Nash equi-
libria? For general valuations the answer is no. Consider, for example, the case of a
buyer who has a very large value for the set of all objects for sale, but no value for
any strict subset. In this case, any positive bid carries great risk: the buyer might win
2Second-price item auctions are also known as Vickrey auctions; we will use these terms interchange-
ably.
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some items but not others, leaving him with negative utility. It therefore seems that
complements do not synergize well with item bidding, and indeed it has been shown
by Hassidim et al. [34] that the price of anarchy (with respect to mixed equilibria) in a
first-price auction can be as high as Ω(
√
m) when bidders’ valuations exhibit comple-
mentarities. The same lower bound can be easily extended to the case of second-price
auctions.3
Our main result in this chapter is that the presence of complements is the only barrier
to a constant price of anarchy. We show that when buyer valuations are complement-
free (a.k.a. subadditive), the (Bayesian) price of anarchy of the simultaneous item auc-
tion mechanism is at most a constant, in both the first- and second-price auctions.
For first-price auctions, we show that any Bayes-Nash equilibrium yields at least half
of the optimal social welfare. This improves upon the previously best-known bound of
O(log n) due to Hassidim et al. [34], where n is the number of bidders.
Result 1: [BPoA≤ 2 in simultaneous first-price auctions.] When buyers have
subadditive valuations, the Bayesian price of anarchy of the simultaneous first-price
item auction mechanism is at most 2.
For simultaneous Vickrey auctions, it is not possible to bound the worst-case perfor-
mance at equilibrium, even when there is only a single object for sale. This impossibility
is due to arguably unnatural equilibria in which certain players grossly overreport their
values, prompting others to bid nothing. To circumvent this issue one must impose an as-
sumption that agents avoid such “overbidding” strategies. In the strong no-overbidding
assumption, used by Christodoulou et al. [17] and Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5], it
is assumed that each agent i chooses bids so that, for every set of objects S , the sum
of the bids on S is at most vi(S ). We show that under this assumption, the Bayesian
3As explained in the sequel, to obtain meaningful results in second-price auctions one needs to impose
no-overbidding assumptions on the bidding strategies, defined formally in Section 5.2.3. The Ω(
√
m)
lower bound extends to the case of second-price auctions under the weak no-overbidding assumption. The
alternative strong no-overbidding assumption is meaningless in the case of complements, as it precludes
item bidding altogether.
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price of anarchy for simultaneous Vickrey auctions is at most 4. This improves upon the
previously best-known bound of O(log n) due to Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5].
Result 2: [BPoA≤ 4 in simultaneous second-price auctions.] When buyers have
subadditive valuations, the Bayesian price of anarchy of the simultaneous Vickrey auc-
tion mechanism is at most 4, under the strong no-overbidding assumption.
The strong no-overbidding assumption is quite strong, as it must hold for every set
of items. A somewhat weaker assumption, referred to as weak no-overbidding, requires
that the no overbidding condition holds only in expectation over the distribution of sets
won by a player at equilibrium. That is, agents are said to be weakly no-overbidding
if they apply strategies such that expected value of each agent’s winnings is at least
the expected sum of his winning bids [27]. Roughly speaking, weak no-overbidding
supposes that agents are generally averse to winning sets with bids that are higher than
their true values. However, unlike strong no-overbidding, it does not preclude strategies
in which an agent overbids on sets that he does not expect to win, i.e. in order to more
accurately express his willingness to pay for other sets.
Notably, the BNE outcomes under the two no-overbidding assumptions are incom-
parable; while the weak assumption is more permissive, and thus enables a richer set
of behaviors in equilibrium, it also introduces new ways to deviate from the prescribed
equilibrium. Therefore, a constant bound on the Bayesian PoA under the weakly no-
overbidding assumption does not follow directly. Nevertheless, we show that the bound
of 4 on the Bayesian PoA extends also to the case of weakly no-overbidding agents.
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5] showed that, under the strong no-overbidding as-
sumption, the Bayesian PoA of the simultaneous Vickrey auction is strictly greater than
2, and furthermore the price of anarchy is Ω(n1/4) when agent values are allowed to be
correlated. In the full version of the paper we show that similar results hold also under
the weak no-overbidding assumption, proving bounds strictly greater than 2 and Ω(n1/6),
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respectively.
Our constant bounds hold for subadditive bidders, whereas constant bounds on
Bayesian price of anarchy were previously known only for the subclass of fraction-
ally subadditive (i.e. XOS) valuations [17]. Previous work that attempted to bound the
BPoA for subadditive valuations [5, 34] provided constant bounds for XOS valuations,
then used the logarithmic factor separation between XOS and subadditive valuations to
establish a logarithmic upper bound on the BPoA for subadditive valuations. While it
seems plausible to use the close relation between XOS and subadditive valuations, any
analysis that follows this trajectory would encounter this inevitable logarithmic gap. The
challenge, therefore, is in developing a new proof technique for subadditive valuations,
which does not go through XOS valuations. This is the approach taken in this work.
It should be noted that subadditive valuations are more expressive than their XOS
counterparts, and obtaining price of anarchy bounds for subadditive valuations is signif-
icantly more challenging. In particular, for XOS valuations, a player who aims to win a
certain set S has a natural choice of bid: the additive valuation that determines his value
for set S . For subadditive valuations, there is no such notion of a natural bid aimed at
representing one’s value for a particular set, and hence even determining how best to bid
on a certain set of interest is a non-trivial task.
Related Work Combinatorial auctions is a canonical subject of study in algorithmic
mechanism design (see 44 and references therein for the large body of literature on
this subject). While most previous work focuses on the design of truthful mechanisms,
we follow the more recent literature on the analysis of simple and practical (albeit not
truthful) auctions.
Following the rich literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) [see, e.g., 35, 49, for
references], Christodoulou et al. [17] pioneered the study of the Bayesian price of an-
archy (BPoA) and applied it to item-bidding auctions. They bounded the BPoA by 2 in
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simultaneous second-price auctions with XOS valuations, which are equivalent to frac-
tionally subadditive functions [24]. The same bound was extended to the more general
class of subadditive valuations by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5], and later to general
valuations by Fu et al. [27], albeit only with respect to pure equilibria (when they exist).
The price of anarchy was studies also in simultaneous first-price auctions by Hassidim
et al. [34], who showed a pure PoA of 1 for general valuations4, and a constant BPoA
for XOS valuations. The effect of the underlying single-item auction on the PoA was
further studied by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [6].
For both first- and second-price simultaneous auctions, the BPoA for subadditive
valuations was not previously known to be better than O(log n). Previous techniques
applied the constant bounds for XOS valuations, using the O(log n) separation between
XOS and subadditive valuations [see e.g. 5].
Studies on PoA and BPoA have provided insights into other settings, e.g. auctions
employing greedy algorithms [38], Generalized Second Price Auctions [37, 39, 14],
uniform-price multi-unit auctions [41], and network formation settings [3].
The smoothness technique for Bayesian games, developed by Rahman [46] and
Syrgkanis [51], provides a method for extending bounds on pure PoA to Bayesian PoA.
However, to the best of our knowledge, our approach does not fall within ehis frame-
work. Roughly speaking, the smoothness framework requires that each player can find a
good “default” strategy given his type, which is independent of the opponents’ strategy
selections. However, subadditive valuations do not seem to admit such bids,5 and indeed
the strategies we consider in our analysis depend heavily on the distribution of strategies
applied by all players at equilibrium.
4Pure Nash equilibria rarely exist in this case though, as they are shown to be equivalent to Walrasian
equilibria of the corresponding two-sided market.
5We note that one can apply the technique on XOS valuations, but because of the O(log n) separation
between XOS and subadditive valuations [see e.g. 5] this gives only a logarithmic bound.
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Organization of the chapter We introduce the necessary background and notation in
Section 5.2. Our analysis then proceeds in two parts. In the first part, Section 5.3, we
consider a single-player game in which the player, a subadditive buyer, must determine
how best to bid on a set of objects against a distribution over price vectors. We show
that, for every distribution for which the expected sum of prices is not too large, the
buyer has a bidding strategy that guarantees a high expected utility (compared to the
player’s value for the set of all objects).
In the second part of our analysis for the first-price (Section 5.4) and Vickrey (Sec-
tion 5.5) auctions, we show that every Bayes-Nash equilibrium must have high expected
social welfare. We do this by considering deviations in which an agent uses the bidding
strategy from the single-player game described in Section 5.3, applied to some subset
of the objects. This subset of objects is chosen randomly: agent i draws a new profile
of types for his opponents from the type distribution, then considers bidding for the set
he would be allocated under this “virtual” type profile. At a BNE, agent i cannot benefit
from such a randomized deviation; we show that this implies that the social welfare at
equilibrium is at least a constant times the optimal welfare.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Combinatorial Auctions and Equilibria
Combinatorial Auctions In a combinatorial auction, m items are sold to n bidders.
Each bidder has a private combinatorial valuation captured by a set function v : 2[m] → R
over different bundles S ⊆ [m]. Throughout the paper we assume the valuations are
monotone, i.e. for every subset S ⊆ T ⊆ [m] it holds that v(S ) ≤ v(T ). In a Bayesian
(partial-information) setting, the bidders’ valuation profile v is drawn from a commonly
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known product distribution6 F = F1 × · · · × Fn. The outcome of an auction consists
of an allocation x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ 2[m]×n, where xi is the bundle of items allocated
to bidder i, and payments made by each bidder. The social welfare of an allocation
is
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi). For any given valuation profile v, we let (OPTv1, . . . ,OPT
v
n) denote the
welfare-maximizing assignment for profile v.
Simultaneous Item-Bidding Auctions In a simultaneous item-bidding auction, each
bidder simultaneously submits a vector of bids, one for each item. The outcome of the
auction is then determined item by item according to the bids placed on each item. In
this paper we study two forms of such auctions: simultaneous first price auctions and
simultaneous second price auctions.7 In both auctions, each item is allocated to the
bidder who has placed the highest bid on it (breaking ties arbitrarily but consistently).
In a (simultaneous) first price auction, the winner of each item pays his bid on that item,
while in a (simultaneous) second price auction, the winner of each item pays the second
highest bid on that item. We now give a more formal description of this process.
We generally write bi( j) to denote the bid of player i on item j, and ~bi for the vector
of bids placed by bidder i. Alternatively, we may think of agent i’s bid bi as an additive
function bi(S ) =
∑
j∈S bi( j) that corresponds8 to the bid-vector ~bi. Given a sequence of
bid profiles b = (b1, . . . , bn), we write Wi(b) for the set of items won by bidder i, and
~pi ∈ Rm the vector of payments made by bidder i on the items. In this notation, the first-
6Whenever an expectation is taken with respect to valuations, it will be assumed that they are drawn
from these corresponding distributions.
7The word “simultaneous” is often omitted, as we study only simultaneous (in contrast to sequential)
auctions.
8There is an easy equivalence between an additive function a(S ) B
∑
j∈S a({ j}) and its concise vector
description ~a = (a({1}), . . . , a({m})). We will use functional and vector representations interchangeably as
the situation demands.
76
and second-price auctions can be summarized as follows:
First-price Vickrey
won set:
Wi(b) = { j ∈ [m] | bi( j) > bk( j),∀k , i}
payment:
pi( j) =
bi( j), j ∈ Wi(b)
0, j < Wi(b)

max
k,i
bk( j), j ∈ Wi(b)
0, j < Wi(b)
We assume bidders have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. the utility of bidder i for a given bid
profile b is given by ui(b) = vi(Wi(b)) − pi(Wi(b)).
A Single Bidder’s Perspective on Bidding In both first- and second-price auctions,
the set of items won by a bidder i bidding bi is determined solely by a coordinate-wise
comparison between bi and the largest bid placed by the other bidders. Let ϕi(b-i) be the
vector whose j-th component is maxk,i bk( j). It is often convenient to write W(bi,b-i) as
W(bi, ~p) where ~p = ϕi(b-i). We think of ~p as the vector of prices perceived by bidder i:
in the second price auction, the bidder pays the price on an item if his bid exceeds it;
and in the first price auction the bidder pays his own bid on such an item, and ~p is the
minimum such winning bid. It is in this light that we often write ϕi(b-i) as prices ~p
when this causes no confusion. We will also shorten the notation v(W(b, ~p)) to v(b, ~p),
meaning the value obtained when bidding b against perceived prices ~p.
Strategies and Equilibria Buyers select their bids strategically in order to maximize
utility. The bidding behavior of a buyer given its valuation is described by a strategy. A
strategy si maps each valuation vi to a distribution over bid vectors; we interpret si(vi)
as the (possibly randomized) set of bids placed by bidder i when his type is vi.
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Definition 5.2.1. (Bayes-Nash Equilibrium) A profile of strategies s =
(s1(v1), . . . , sn(vn)) is in Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for distribution F if, for every
buyer i, type vi, and bidding strategy s˜i,
Ev−i
 Eb-i∼s(v−i),
bi∼si(vi)
[ui(bi,b-i)]
 ≥ Ev−i
 Eb-i∼s(v−i),
b˜i∼s˜i
[
ui(˜bi,b-i)
] .
Given Fubini’s Theorem, we can shorten the condition as follows (such shorthand
forms are used throughout the paper):
Ev−i,b∼s(v) [ui(b)] ≥ Ev−i,b∼s(v),˜bi∼s˜i
[
ui(˜bi,b-i)
]
. (5.1)
Definition 5.2.2. (Bayesian Price of Anarchy) Given an auction type (either first- or
second-price), the Bayesian price of anarchy (BPoA) is the worst-case ratio between the
expected optimal welfare and the expected welfare at a BNE and is given by
max
(F , s):
s a BNE for F
Ev[
∑
i vi(OPT
v
i )]
Ev,b∼s(v)[
∑
i vi(Wi(b))]
.
For second price auctions we will consider BPoA under natural restrictions on the
strategies used by the bidders. In such cases, the maximum in Definition 5.2.2 is taken
with respect to BNE under that restricted class of strategies. We note that a BNE is
guaranteed to exist as long as the space of valuations and potential bids is discretized,
say with all values expressed as increments of some  > 0. A more detailed discussion
of BNE existence appears in the full version of the paper.
5.2.2 Subadditive Valuations
We focus on valuations that are complement-free in the following general sense:
Definition 5.2.3. A set function v : 2[m] → R+ is subadditive if, for any subsets S 1, S 2 ⊂
[m],
v(S 1) + v(S 2) ≥ v(S 1 ∪ S 2).
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The class of subadditive functions strictly includes a hierarchy of more restrictive
complement-free functions such as submodular and gross substitute functions (see 36 for
definitions and discussions). Among these, the XOS functions, as defined below, have
a particular kinship with subadditive functions. XOS literally means XOR (taking the
maximum) of OR’s (taking sums), and this class of valuations is known to be equivalent
to the class of fractionally subadditive functions [24].
Definition 5.2.4. A function v : 2[m] → R+ is said to be XOS if there exists a collection
of additive functions a1(·), . . . , ak(·) (that is, ai(S ) B ∑ j∈S ai({ j}) for every set S ⊂ [m]),
such that for each S ⊆ [m], v(S ) B max1≤i≤k ai(S ).
One of the characterizations of XOS functions uses the following definition.
Definition 5.2.5. A function f (·) is said to be dominated by a set function g(·) if for any
subset S ⊆ [m], f (S ) ≤ g(S ). We say that a vector ~a = (a1, . . . , am) is dominated by a
set function v(·), if as an additive function a(·) is dominated by v(·).
It is not too difficult to observe that v(·) is XOS if and only if for every set T ⊂ [m]
there is an additive function a(·) dominated by v(·) such that a(T ) = v(T ).
For a general subadditive function v(·), it can be the case that any additive function
a(·) dominated by v(·) has Ω(log(m)) gap from v([m]), i.e. Ω(log(m))a([m]) ≤ v([m]),
(See 5 for such an example) and a logarithmic factor is also an upper bound. Previous
work that attempted to bound the BPoA for subadditive valuations [5, 34] provided con-
stant bounds for XOS valuations, then used the logarithmic factor separation between
XOS and subadditive valuations to establish a logarithmic upper bound on the BPoA for
subadditive valuations. In order to establish a constant bound for subadditive valuations,
we turn to a different technique.
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5.2.3 Overbidding
It is well known that in second price auctions, even with only a single item, the price
of anarchy can be infinite when bidders are not restricted in their bids.9 To exclude
such pathological cases, previous literature [e.g. 17, 5] has made the following no-
overbidding assumption standard:10
Definition 5.2.6. A bidder is strongly no-overbidding if his bid b(·) is dominated by his
valuation v(·).
In other words, a bidder is guaranteed to derive non-negative utility, no matter what
are the prices in the market. Thus strong no overbidding is a strong risk-aversion as-
sumption on the buyers. One may also consider less risk concerned bidders—in the
following we generalize a weaker assumption of no-overbidding introduced by Fu et al.
[27].
Definition 5.2.7. Given a price distribution F, a bidder is said to be weakly no-
overbidding if his bid vector b satisfies
Ep∼F[v(W(b, p))] ≥ Ep∼F[b(W(b, p))], where W(b, p) denotes the subset of items he
wins when he bids b at price p, i.e., W(b, p) = { j ∈ [m] | b( j) ≥ p( j)}.
We will bound BPoA under both weakly and strongly no-overbidding assumptions
for simultaneous second price auctions (note that these sets are incomparable).
5.3 Bidding Under Uncertain Prices
As discussed in Section 5.2, a bidder in a simultaneous auction faces the problem of
maximizing his utility in presence of uncertain prices (which are the largest bids placed
9A canonical example is two bidders who value the item at 0 and a large number h, respectively, but
the first bidder bids h + 1 and the second bidder bids 0.
10We note that such no-overbidding assumptions were also made in other contexts [e.g. 38, 37].
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by other bidders). While this maximization problem is intricate, we show in this section
particular bidding strategies that result in utilities comparable with the bidder’s value
of the whole bundle minus the expected total prices. In other words, given a price
distribution F, it is desired to have a bidding strategy b such that
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p)
] − b([m]) ≥ αv([m]) − Ep∼F [p([m])] , (5.2)
for some constant α. Such bidding strategies are key ingredients of the BPoA proofs in
later sections, and may also be of independent interest.
For fixed prices, achieving (5.2) is trivial, even for α = 1; indeed, given a price vector
~p, by bidding according to b = p, a bidder obtains v(b, p) − b([m]) = v([m]) − p([m]).
The case in which prices are drawn at random is more intricate, and is the subject of the
remainder of this section.
Lemma 5.3.1 (Bidding against a price distribution). For any distribution F of
prices p and any subadditive valuation v(·) there exists a bid b0 such that
Ep∼F
[
v(b0, p)
] − b0([m]) ≥ 12v([m]) − Ep∼F [p([m])] . (5.3)
Proof. We show a random bidding strategy that guarantees the desired inequality in
expectation, and infer the existence of a bid, drawn from the suggested distribution, that
achieves the same inequality. Consider a bid that is drawn according to the exact same
distribution as the prices. It holds that
Eb∼F
[
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p)
]]
= Ep∼F
[
Eb∼F
[
v(b, p)
]]
=
1
2
Eb∼F
[
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p) + v(p, b)
]]
≥ 1
2
Eb∼F
[
Ep∼F [v([m])]
]
=
1
2
v([m]),
where the inequality follows from subadditivity (which guarantees that v(b, p)+v(p, b) ≥
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v([m]) for every p and b). Using the last inequality, it follows that
Eb∼F
[
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p)
] − b([m])] ≥ 1
2
v([m]) − Eb∼F [b([m])]
=
1
2
v([m]) − Ep∼F [p([m])] .
Since a bid drawn from F satisfies (5.3) in expectation, there must exist a bid b0 satisfy-
ing (5.3). 
Safe Bidding Under Uncertainty
As noted in Section 5.2.3, in order to obtain any meaningful bound on BPoA for second
price auctions, one needs to assume that bidders are not overbidding. Unfortunately,
Lemma 5.3.1 is not concerned with such requirements. This problem is addressed in
Lemma 5.3.3, where it is shown that a strongly no-overbidding strategy analogous to
that in Lemma 5.3.1 always exists.
Notably, when the no-overbidding requirement is imposed, the existence of a bid sat-
isfying (5.2) is nontrivial even for the case in which the prices are fixed. The following
lemma, rephrased from 5, establishes its existence:
Lemma 5.3.2 (follows from Lemma 3.3 in 5). For a given price vector p and any
subadditive valuation v(·) there exists a bid b dominated by v(·) such that
v(b, p) − b([m]) ≥ v([m]) − p([m]).
We now turn to analyze the case of random prices.
Lemma 5.3.3 (No Overbidding Against Price Distributions). For any distribution F
of prices p and any subadditive valuation v(·) there exists a bid b0 dominated by v(·)
such that
Ep∼F
[
v(b0, p)
] − b0([m]) ≥ 12v([m]) − Ep∼F [p([m])] . (5.4)
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Proof. Let q be any price vector in the support of the distribution F. Let T ⊆ [m] be
a maximal set such that v(T ) ≤ q(T ). We consider a truncated price vector q˜, which is
set to 0 on the coordinates corresponding to T , and coincides with q on the coordinates
corresponding to [m] \ T .
We first observe that q˜ is dominated by v(·). Indeed, for any set R ⊂ [m] \ T it holds
that v(R) > q(R), since otherwise
v(R ∪ T ) ≤ v(R) + v(T ) ≤ q(R) + q(T ) = q(R ∪ T ),
in contradiction to the fact that T is a maximal set satisfying v(T ) ≤ q(T ).
We next establish that for any bid b, it holds that
v(b, q) + q([m]) ≥ v(b, q˜) + q˜([m]). (5.5)
Indeed, we have W(b, q˜) ⊆ W(b, q) ∪ T . Therefore, v(b, q˜) ≤ v(b, q) + v(T ) due to
subadditivity of v(·). Now (5.5) follows by observing that q([m])−q˜([m]) = q(T ) ≥ v(T ).
We next define the distribution D˜ B {˜q | q ∼ F}, which consists of truncated prices
drawn from F. Equation (5.5) now extends for any bid b to
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p) + p([m])
] ≥ E p˜∼D˜ [v(b, p˜) + p˜([m])] . (5.6)
Recall that each q˜ ∼ D˜ is dominated by v(·), therefore, bidding any b drawn from
D˜ satisfies the strongly no overbidding requirement. Furthermore, by applying (5.6) to
each b ∼ D˜ we get
E
b∼D˜
[
Ep∼F
[
v(b, p) + p([m])
]] ≥ E
b∼D˜
[
Ep˜∼D˜
[
v(b, p˜) + p˜([m])
]]
= Eb∼D˜
[
Ep˜∼D˜
[
v(b, p˜)
]]
+ Eb∼D˜ [b([m])]
≥ 1
2
v([m]) + Eb∼D˜ [b([m])] ,
where the last inequality follows in a manner similar to the proof of Lemma 5.3.1. The
assertion of the lemma follows. 
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5.4 BPoA of First Price Auctions
In this section we apply the bidding strategy from Lemma 5.3.1 to bound the Bayesian
price of anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions.
Theorem 5.4.1. In a simultaneous first-price auction with subadditive bidders, the
Bayesian price of anarchy is at most 2.
Proof. We begin with a brief outline of the proof. Our plan is to fix a Bayes-Nash equi-
librium and then consider, for each agent, a potential deviating strategy. This deviation
will use the bidding strategy from Lemma 5.3.1, applied to some subset of the objects.
To determine which subset to bid upon, each agent i will do the following: given her
own value vi, she will draw a “virtual” type profile v∗−i for the other agents from distri-
bution F , and then bid upon the set that she would be assigned in the optimal allocation
for (vi, v∗−i). To determine how to bid upon this set, she draws a second type profile for
the other agents, v−i, as dictated by Lemma 5.3.1. At BNE, agent i cannot benefit from
such a randomized deviation; this implies a bound on the expected utility of each agent
at equilibrium (inequality (5.8)). By taking a sum over all agents and using linearity of
expectation to disentangle the random variables v and v′∗, we show that this implies the
social welfare at equilibrium is at least a constant times the optimal welfare.
We now proceed with the details, beginning with notation. Fix type distributions
F = ∏ni=1 Fi and let s be a BNE for F . Fix an agent i and an arbitrary subadditive
valuation vi. Fix an arbitrary v−i, and let v = (vi, v−i). Fix an arbitrary v∗−i, and let
v∗ = (vi, v∗−i). Recall that (OPT
v∗
1 , . . . ,OPT
v∗
n ) is the welfare-optimal allocation for v∗.
Recall that each bid profile b-i induces a price vector ϕi(b-i) on bidder i. Let ~p be
equal to ϕi(b-i) on OPTv
∗
i and 0 elsewhere. Let F be the distribution over these price
vectors ~p = ~p(b-i), where b ∼ s(v). That is, F is precisely the distribution over the
maximum bids on the items in OPTv
∗
i , excluding the bid of player i. Note that v∗, which
is different from v, was used only to determine the set OPTv
∗
i , whereas v determines the
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distribution of prices over the items in OPTv
∗
i . Much of the following proof involves
handling and, to some extent, disentangling the two. By replacing [m] by OPTv
∗
i in
Lemma 5.3.1, there exists a bid vector bi′ over the objects in OPTv
∗
i such that, thinking
now of p as an additive function,
Ep∼F
[
vi(bi′, p)
] − bi′(OPTv∗i )
≥ 1
2
vi(OPTv
∗
i ) − Ep∼F
[
p(OPTv
∗
i )
]
. (5.7)
Since s forms a BNE, we have that
E
v−i,
b∼s(v)
[ui(b)] ≥ Ev−i,
b∼s(v)
[
ui(bi′,b-i)
]
= E
v−i,
b∼s(v)
[
vi(bi′, ϕi(b-i))
] − E
v−i,
b∼s(v)
[
bi′(Wi(bi′,b-i))
]
≥ Ep∼F [vi(bi′, p)] − bi′(OPTv∗i ),
where the last inequality follows from the definition of F and the fact that Wi(bi′,b-i) ⊆
OPTv
∗
i for all b-i. Applying (5.7) and the definition of p ∼ F, we conclude that
E
v−i,
b∼s(v)
[ui(b)] (5.8)
≥ 1
2
vi(OPTv
∗
i ) − Ev−i,
b-i∼s−i(v−i)
 ∑
j∈OPTv∗i
max
k,i
bk( j)
 .
Taking the sum over all i and expectations over all vi ∼ Fi and v∗−i ∼ F−i, we conclude
that
∑
i
E
v,v∗−i,
b∼s(v)
[ui(b)] ≥ 12
∑
i
E
vi,v∗−i
[
vi(OPTv
∗
i )
]
(5.9)
−
∑
i
E
v,v∗−i,
b-i∼s−i(v−i)
 ∑
j∈OPTv∗i
max
k,i
bk( j)
 .
Let us consider each of the three terms of (5.9) in turn. The LHS is equal to
Ev,b∼s(v)[
∑
i ui(b)], as v∗−i does not appear inside the expectation. The first term on the
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RHS is equal to 12 Ev[
∑
i vi(OPT
v
i )], by relabeling v∗−i by v−i. For the final term on the
RHS of (5.9), we note that
∑
i
E
v,v∗−i,
b-i∼s−i(v−i)
 ∑
j∈OPTv∗i
max
k,i
bk( j)

≤
∑
i
E
v,v∗−i ,̂vi,
b∼s(̂vi,v−i)
 ∑
j∈OPTv∗i
max
k
bk( j)

= E
v,b∼s(v)
∑
j
max
k
bk( j)
 ,
where the first inequality follows due to the fact we take a maximum over a larger set,
and the last equality follows from the fact that OPTv
∗
i imposes a partition over [m], and
by relabeling. We note a subtlety: in the first line we select a bid vector b with respect to
(̂vi, v−i), rather than (vi, v−i), so that b is independent of the partition (OPTv
∗
1 , . . . ,OPT
v∗
n ).
Applying these simplifications to the terms of (5.9), we conclude that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
ui(b)
 ≥ 12 Ev
∑
i
vi(OPTvi )
 (5.10)
− Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
j
max
k
bk( j)
 .
Since we are in a first-price auction setting, it holds that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
ui(b)
 = Ev,b∼s(v) ∑
i
vi(Wi(b))

− Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
j
max
k
bk( j)
 .
Equation (5.10) therefore implies that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
vi(Wi(b))
 ≥ 12 Ev
∑
i
vi(OPTvi )
 ,
which yields the desired result. 
Remark: In the full version of the paper we show that the upper bound does not carry
over to the case where the bidders’ valuations are correlated. Specifically, a polynomial
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lower bound of Ω(n1/6) is given on the Bayesian price of anarchy for this case. The
construction is based on a lower bound due to Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5] for
second-price auctions.
5.5 BPoA of Second Price Auctions
We now turn to the case of simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that the
Bayesian price of anarchy of such an auction is always at most 4 for subadditive bid-
ders, assuming that bidders’ valuations are independent and bidders select strategies that
satisfy either the strong or weak no-overbidding assumption.
Theorem 5.5.1. In simultaneous second-price auctions where bidders have subadditive
valuations, and every bidder is either strongly or weakly no-overbidding, the Bayesian
price of anarchy is at most 4.
Proof. Fix type distributions F and let s be a BNE for F . We can then derive in-
equality (5.10) in precisely the same way as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1 (using now
Lemma 5.3.3 instead of Lemma 5.3.1); we then have that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
ui(b)
 ≥ 12 Ev
∑
i
vi(OPTvi )
 (5.11)
− Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
j
max
k
bk( j)
 .
Note that Ev,b∼s(v)[
∑
i vi(Wi(b))] ≥ Ev,b∼s(v)[∑i ui(b)]. Also, since each agent i is assumed
to be strongly or weakly no overbidding, it holds that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
j
max
k
bk( j)
 = Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
∑
j∈Wi(b)
bi( j)

≤ Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
vi(Wi(b))
 .
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Equation (5.11) therefore implies that
Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
vi(Wi(b))
 ≥ 12 Ev
∑
i
vi(OPTvi )

− Ev,b∼s(v)
∑
i
vi(Wi(b))
 ,
as required. 
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5] showed that the Bayesian price of anarchy of sec-
ond price auctions can be strictly worse than the pure price of anarchy when bidders
are strongly no overbidding. In what follows we give an example showing that such a
gap exists also when bidders are weakly no overbidding. We note that this gap is not
implied by the example given by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden since the strategy profile
in their example is not a BNE under the weaker no overbidding notion (as can be easily
verified). The full analysis of the example appears in the full version of the paper; the
following is a sketch.
Example 5.5.1 (Bayesian price of anarchy can be strictly larger than 2 when bidders
are weakly no overbidding and have subadditive valuations). Consider an instance
with 2 bidders and 6 items, where the set of items is divided into two sets, of 3 items
each, denoted S 1 and S 2. Throughout, we shall present the example with parameters a
and b for ease of presentation. The lower bound is obtained by substituting a = 0.06
and b = 0.85. In what follows, we describe the valuation function of bidder 1; bidder
2’s valuation is symmetric w.r.t. the sets S 1 and S 2. Bidder 1’s valuation over the items
in S 1 is additive with respective values (over the 3 items) of (a, a, b), (b, a, a) or (a, b, a),
each with probability 1/3. Bidder 1’s valuation over the items in S 2 is 2 if she gets all
three items, and 1 for any non-empty strict subset of S 2. Bidder 1’s valuation for an
arbitrary subset T the maximum of her value for T ∩ S 1 and her value for T ∩ S 2. One
can verify that this is indeed a subadditive valuation function.
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We claim that the profile in which each bidder i bids her true (additive) valuation
on S i and 0 on all other items is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with weakly no overbidding
bidders for the specified parameter values. The full proof is deferred to the full version
of the paper, where it is shown that the only beneficial deviations break the weakly
no-overbidding assumption. Under this bidding profile, each bidder derives a utility
of 2a + b, amounting to a social welfare of 2(2a + b) = 1.94. In contrast, if bidder
1 is allocated S 2 and bidder 2 is allocated S 1, then each bidder derives a utility of 2,
amounting to a social welfare of 4. Consequently, the Bayesian price of anarchy is
4/1.94 > 2.061.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FROM Chapter 4
A.1 Single-dimensional Proofs
We prove that single-dimensional linear agents are revenue linear. In the proof below
P(qˆ) denotes the expected revenue from posting price V(qˆ), i.e., P(qˆ) = qˆ · V(qˆ).
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2. Given the setup in Section 4.2 it suffices to upper bound the
optimal revenue by the marginal revenue. Consider the following sequence of steps, the
second of which invokes revenue equivalence. Suppose we optimize for xˆ and get some
(possibly more restrictive) allocation rule x, then x better be a fixed point of Rev[·];
moreover,
Rev[xˆ] = Rev[x].
By revenue equivalence, the revenue of any allocation rule is given by its price-posting
revenue curve P(·), i.e.,
Rev[x] = Eq
[−x′(q) · P(q)] .
But, by definition P(q) ≤ R(q) for all q, so this revenue is upper bounded as,
Eq
[−x′(q) · P(q)] ≤ E [−x′(q) · R(q)] = E [R′(q) · x(q)] ,
which is equal to the marginal revenue for x. Applying integration by parts,1
E
[
R′(q) · x(q)] = E [−R′′(q) · X(q)] ,
Because X(q) ≤ Xˆ(q) for all q and “−R′′(q)” is non-negative by the concavity of R(q),
we have,
E
[−R′′(q) · X(q)] ≤ E [−R′′(q) · Xˆ(q)] .
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Integrating by parts (reverse of the above), we have the marginal revenue of xˆ.
E [−R′′(q) · Xˆ(q)] = MR[xˆ]. 
We conclude that the revenues are equal as, of course, MR[xˆ] ≤ Rev[xˆ].
A.2 Proofs from Section 4.3
In this appendix we prove Theorem 4.3.1.
Lemma (Lemma 4.3.2). For a linear single-agent problem, let x be the optimal allo-
cation rule subject to some constraint xˆ. Then, for any qˆ such that R′′(qˆ) , 0 we have
X(qˆ) = Xˆ(qˆ).
Proof. Since x is the optimal allocation rule subject to xˆ, we have Rev(x) = Rev(xˆ).
Linearity implies that
MR(xˆ) =
∫ 1
0
x(q)R′(q) dq =
∫ 1
0
xˆ(q)R′(q) dq = MR(x).
Integrating by parts, we have[
X(q)R′(q)
]1
0
−
∫ 1
0
X(q)R′′(q) dq =
[
Xˆ(q)R′(q)
]1
0
−
∫ 1
0
Xˆ(q)R′′(q) dq. (A.1)
Since xˆ and x have the same ex ante probability of allocation Xˆ(1) = X(1); by
definition X(0) = Xˆ(0) = 0. By combining these observations with (A.1) we have∫ 1
0
X(q)R′′(q) dq =
∫ 1
0
Xˆ(q)R′′(q) dq,
and therefore, ∫ 1
0
[X(q) − Xˆ(q)]R′′(q) dq = 0. (A.2)
Notice that for any q, X(q) − Xˆ(q) and R′′(q) are non-positive (by domination and
concavity, respectively) so their product is non-negative. Therefore, (A.2) can be satis-
fied only if [X(q) − Xˆ(q)]R′′(q) = 0 for all q. This implies that if R′′(q) < 0, then we
must have X(q) = Xˆ(q), which completes the proof. 
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Lemma 4.3.2 in particular implies that for q with R′′(q) , 0 the q-step mechanism
(for step constraint xˆqˆ) has allocation rule xqˆ = xˆqˆ. I.e., the q-step mechanism has full
lotteries only (no partial lotteries).
For any such q, define Tq to be the set of types allocated (with full lotteries) in the
optimal allocation subject to xˆqˆ. The following lemma shows that these sets are nested.
Lemma A.2.1. For a revenue-linear single-agent problem, for any q1 > q2 and
R′′(q1),R′′(q2) , 0, we must have Tq1 ⊇ Tq2 .
Proof. Assume for contradiction that Tq2\Tq1 , ∅. Let α = F(Tq2\Tq1) > 0. Consider
the following allocation constraint
xˆ(q) =

1 q ≤ q2
1/2 q1 ≤ q ≤ q2
0 q1 ≤ q.
By revenue linearity, the revenue of the optimal auction subject to xˆ is [R(q1)+R(q2)]/2.
Notice that the mechanism that runs R(q1) and R(q2) each with probability 1/2 achieves
this revenue. The allocation rule x of this mechanism is
x(q) =

1 q ≤ q2 − α
1/2 q2 − α ≤ q ≤ q1 + α
0 q1 + α ≤ q.
Notice that this allocation rule is dominated by xˆ, and achieves the optimal revenue. Yet,
we have
Xˆ(q1) =
∫ q1
q=0
xˆ(q)dq >
∫ q1
q=0
x(q)dq = X(q1).
This contradicts Lemma 4.3.2. 
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A.3 Linearity
In this section we prove the linearity of the unit demand problem when the distribution
of items is U[0, 1]m for any number of items m. We use the following lemma first noted
by Rochet [47].
Lemma A.3.1. Utility function u corresponds to a truthful mechanism if and only if it is
convex. In this case, p(t) = ∇u · t − u(t), and x(t) = ∇u(t).
Therefore, the allocation of a type t is |∇u(t)|, the L1 norm of the vector ∇u(t). Let
W be the space of convex utility functions u. Let c be the cost of producing an item.
Using the above lemma, we can reformulate the rev problem as follows:
maximize
∫
T
[∇u(t) · t − u(t)] f (t) dt − c~1 ·
∫
T
∇u(t) f (t) dt
s.t. u ∈ W
∀S ⊆ T,
∫
S
|∇u(t)| dt ≤ X( f (S )).
For any t ∈ T , define the function rt : [0, 1]→ T as follows:
rt(x) = x · t
Notice that r(0) = 0, and r(1) = t. We now use the gradient theorem and write
∀t, u(t) − u(0) =
∫ 1
0
∇u(r(x)) · r′(x) dx.
In the optimal solution, u(0) = 0. Also, by definition of r, r′(x) = t. Therefore we
have
u(t) =
∫ 1
0
∇u(x · t) · t dx.
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Using the above equation, we can rewrite the objective function as∫
T
∇u(t) · (t − c~1) −
∫ 1
0
∇u(x · t) · t dx dt
=
∫
T
∇u(t) · (t − c~1) dt −
∫ 1
0
∫
T
∇u(x · t) · t dt dx.
In the second term, change variables by defining v = (v1, v2) = xt. Notice that
t = v/x, and dvi = xdti for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore dv = dt/xm. Define Tx to be t ∈ T
such that maxt1,t2 ≤ x. The objective is∫
T
∇u(t) · (t − c~1) dt −
∫ 1
0
∫
v∈Tx
∇u(v) · (v/x) · (1/xm) dv dx
=
∫
T
∇u(t) · (t − c~1) dt −
∫
v∈T
∇u(v) · v
∫ 1
x=maxi vi
1/xm+1 dx dv
=
∫
T
∇u(t) · (t − c~1) dt −
∫
v∈T
∇u(v) · v( 1
m maxm vi
− 1
m
) dv
=
∫
T
∇u(t) · [t(1 + 1
m
− 1
m maxm ti
) − c~1] dt
=
∫
T
∇u(t) · [t(m + 1
m
− 1
m maxm ti
) − c~1] dt.
We now show that relaxing the convexity constraint on u does not affect the optimum
solution. Consider a type t such that t1 = maxi ti (the other cases are similar). Since
∇1u(t), . . . ,∇mu(t) appear in the same set of constraints, we can assume that ∇iu(t) = 0
for all i , 1 in the optimum solution. We can therefore remove such variables. This
converts the problem into a polymatroid optimization. Since (maxi ti)(m+1m − 1m maxm ti ) is
non-decreasing in t and the the feasibility constraints are symmetric, we conclude that
types are ordered by maxi ti. This implies that the optimum solution is as follows:
u(t) =

0 maxi ti ≤ tˆc∫ maxi ti
x=tˆc
X′(1 − xm) dx maxi ti > tˆc,
where tˆc solves
t(
m + 1
m
− 1
mtm
) = c
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Note, for example, that tˆ0 =
m
√
1
m+1 . This function u specified above is convex and
linear in X.
A.4 Proofs from Section 4.4.2
We now give a general procedure for implementing marginal revenue maximization with
general agents. Consider an agent with interim allocation constraint xˆMR (from marginal
revenue maximization) and mix over qˆ-constrained lottery pricing with probability den-
sity given by − ddqˆ xˆMR(qˆ) to get outcome rule w˜MR. Recall each ex ante constrained lottery
pricing is derived by optimizing revenue subject to a step function constraint on the al-
location rule. The resulting outcome rule induces a normalized allocation rule that may
not be a step function. Therefore, xMR is dominated by but not necessarily equal to xˆMR.
A natural approach to deriving an ordering on types and thus mapping types to quan-
tiles would be to use the mapping given by Quant(·) for xMR, where quantile of a type
is the probability that a type drawn at random has a higher probability of service. This
approach would result in allocation rule xˆMR not the desired allocation rule xMR. Instead
the map from types to quantiles needs to be randomized to make it “worse” and equal
to the desired allocation rule xMR.
For uniform distributions over discrete type spaces, domination of allocation rules
is equivalent to vector majorization. Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [30] show a trans-
formation can be given between one and the other via a doubly stochastic matrix. This
implies an algorithm for mapping types to quantiles based on solving a quadratic sized
linear program: solve for the doubly stochastic matrix that gives xMR from xˆMR, map an
agent type to quantile via Quant(·) induced by xMR, and randomly map this quantile to
a distribution over quantiles by sampling according to the probabilities in the quantile’s
row in the matrix.
As we do not need to construct the matrix, but only to sample from a specific row
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there is a much simpler construction. This construction further generalizes to non-
uniform distributions. Instead of permutation matrices this approach is based on apply-
ing a sequence of interval resamplings. An interval resampling is given by an interval
[a, b] and if the quantile is in [a, b] it is resampled uniformly from [a, b], otherwise it is
unchanged. For allocation rule x, resampling quantiles from [a, b] has the effect of re-
placing the interval of the cumulative allocation rule X with the line segment connecting
(a, X(a)) to (b, X(b)). The construction below, for type spaces of size m = |T |, calculates
the requisite sequence of at most m interval resamplings in linear time.
Definition A.4.1. For allocation constraint xˆ and dominated allocation rule x satisfying
Xˆ(1) = X(1) on m discrete types, the interval resampling sequence construction starts
with x(0) = xˆ and calculates x( j+1) from x( j) while x( j) , x as follows.
(a) Find the highest quantile q where x(q) , x( j)(q).
(b) Let q′ > q be the quantile at which the line tangent to X at q with slope x(q) crosses
X( j).2
(c) The jth resampling interval is [q, q′].
(d) Let x( j+1) be x( j) averaged on [q, q′].
Proposition A.4.1. The interval sampling sequence construction gives a sequence of
at most m intervals such that the composition of xˆ with the sequence of resamplings
applied to Quant(·) is equal to x.
Proof. The proof is by induction on j where the jth step assumes the first j− 1 types, in
order of Quant(·), satisfy x( j−1)(Quant(t)) = x(Quant(t)). Consider step j. The assump-
tion that Xˆ(1) = X(1) ensures that the intersection of the tangent happens at a q′ ≤ 1.
The line segment connecting interval [q, q′] of X( j) has slope equal to x(q), by definition.
2For discrete type, this intersection may happen at a quantile q′ that does not correspond to the bound-
ary between two types. When this happens split the type into two types each occurring with the same total
probability and with the boundary between them at q′.
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Therefore, the jth step in the construction leaves x( j)(Quant(t)) = x(Quant(t)) for the
jth type. The procedure is linear time as both xˆ and x are, without loss of generality,
piece-wise constant with m pieces, and in each step q and q′ are increasing and at least
one piece from xˆ or x is processed. 
The final ingredient in the construction of the marginal revenue mechanism for
agents with general types is in converting the allocation rule back into an outcome rule.
This can be done exactly as in Alaei et al. [1]: if an agent with type t is served by the
allocation rule, sample from service outcomes of w˜MR(t), otherwise sample from non-
service outcomes of w˜MR(t).
Definition A.4.2. The marginal revenue mechanism for general agents works as follows.
(a) Map reported types t = (t1, . . . , tn) of agents to quantiles q = (q1, . . . , qn) by, for
each agent, composing the interval resampling transformation with Quant(·).
(b) Calculate the marginal revenue of each agent i as R′i(qi).
(c) Calculate the set of agents to be served by marginal revenue maximization.
(d) Calculate outcomes for each agent i as:
• sample wi ∼ w˜MRi (ti) conditioned on Alloc(wi) = 1 if i is to be served, or
• sample wi ∼ w˜MRi (ti) conditioned on Alloc(wi) = 0 if i is not to be served.
Note that instead of calculating outcome rules by mixing over step mechanisms we
could, from the allocation constraint xˆMR for an agent, calculate the optimal mechanism
subject to that constraint, i.e., with outcome rule Outcome(xˆMR) and revenue Rev(xˆMR).
The construction above can be invoked with this outcome rule in place of w˜MR without
modification; this change generally improves revenue.
The assumption in the interval resampling sequence construction that the allocation
constraint xˆ and the desired allocation x have cumulative allocations satisfying Xˆ(1) =
97
X(1) can be removed in downward closed settings. With this constraint removed the
line tangent to X at q may be strictly below Xˆ at 1. If this happens we set q′ = 1 and
probabilistically reject a quantile falling in this interval. The probability of rejection is
set so that the slope of the resampled allocation rule is x(q).
Proposition A.4.2. In downward closed settings, a normalized allocation rule x domi-
nated by an allocation rule xˆ, where Xˆ(1) > X(1), can still be implemented by interval
resamplings given in Definition A.4.1, and a marginal revenue mechanism for x can run
similarly as in Definition A.4.2.
We use xˆ  x to refer to this weaker definition of dominance in downward closed
settings.
A.5 Proofs for unit-demand approximation
Theorem 4.5.3 is a consequence of the two lemmas below and Proposition 4.5.2.
Lemma A.5.1. Twice the optimal representative revenue is a linear upper bound on the
optimal unit-demand revenue.
Proof. Linearity follows simply from the revenue linearity of single-dimensional agents.
Consider the distribution of the maximum virtual value (or zero if the maximum virtual
value is negative) in the representative environment. Index this distribution by quantile
as ψmax(qˆ). The optimal revenue for any allocation constraint xˆ is Eqˆ[ψmax(qˆ)xˆ(qˆ)] which
is linear in xˆ; this follows from the proof that the optimal revenue in single-dimensional
environments is the virtual surplus maximizer.
We now show that twice the optimal representative revenue upper bounds the opti-
mal unit-demand revenue. To do this we will give two auctions for the representative
environment with the allocation constraint xˆ and show that the sum of these auctions’
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revenue upper bounds the optimal unit-demand revenue for the same constraint. Of
course, optimal representative revenue upper bounds each of these auctions revenue.
A mechanism for the unit-demand problem is simply a lottery pricing, i.e., it is a
set of lotteries L with each ` ∈ L taking the form of (p`, pi`1, . . . , pi`m) with
∑
j pi
`
j ≤ 1.
The semantics of a lottery ` is that the agent pays the price p` and then is allocated an
item j at random with probability pi`j; the semantics of the collection of lotteries L is that
the agent, upon drawing her type from the distribution, chooses the lottery ` ∈ L that
maximizes her utility (or none).
Given any collection of lotteries L that satisfies the allocation constraint xˆ we define
two auctions for the representative environment that have combined revenue at least that
of the collection of lotteries in the unit-demand environment.
The L mimicking auction considers the profile of values v = (v1, . . . , vm) of the repre-
sentatives and the lottery ` ∈ L that would have been selected by the unit-demand agent
with these values. It serves the representative j with the highest value with probability
pi`j and charges her p
` − ∑ j′, j pi`j′v j′ + µ(v(2)) where µ(v(2)) is the expected utility of the
unit-demand agent with valuation profile v(2) which is v with v j replaced with max j′, j v j′ .
Notice that the utility of the winning representative j in this auction is exactly the same
as the unit-demand agent less an amount that is a function only of the values of the other
representatives, v− j. As the utility of the unit-demand agent is monotone in her value
for each item, the utility each representative has for winning is negative when she is not
the highest valued representative and positive when she is. Therefore, this auction is
incentive compatible, has revenue at least p`j −
∑
j′, j pi
`
j′v j′ on valuation profile v where
j is the highest valued representative, and satisfies allocation constraint xˆ. For a given
valuation profile, call the second term in the winning agent’s payment the deficit of the
L mimicking auction.
The motivation for the next auction is that we want to obtain back the deficit lost
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by the L mimicking auction. Notice that the procedure that charges the highest valued
representative the second highest value and serves with probability
∑
j pi
`
j satisfies the al-
location constraint xˆ and more than balances the deficit; however, it may not be incentive
compatible.
The allocation constrained second-price auction sells to the highest valued repre-
sentative at the second highest representative’s value so as to maximize revenue subject
to the allocation constraint xˆ that any representative is served. Consider the distribution
of the second order statistic of values and let ν(2)(q) be the value that the q quantile of
this random variable takes on. The optimal revenue obtainable via a second price auc-
tion with allocation constraint xˆ is Eq[ν(2)(q)xˆ(q)]. To obtain this revenue, conditioning
on the second highest value being v, with probability xˆ(ν−1(2)(v)) we serve the highest val-
ued representative and charge her v. This auction is incentive compatible and revenue
optimal (in expectation) among all second-price procedures that meet the allocation con-
straint. Therefore, it more than covers the expected deficit of the L mimicking auction.
We have given two incentive compatible auctions for the representative environ-
ment with combined expected revenue exceeding the revenue of the lottery pricing L.
Therefore, twice the optimal representative revenue is at least the optimal unit-demand
revenue. 
Lemma A.5.2. The pseudo revenue curve R˜(·) from uniform virtual pricings for a unit-
demand agent 2-approximates the optimal representative revenue curve (as a function
of qˆ for any qˆ-step constraint).
Proof. Denote the optimal representative revenue for the qˆ-step constraint as a function
of qˆ by the revenue curve ORR(qˆ). Consider the outcome of the optimal auction for the
representative environment with ex ante service constraint qˆ. It sets a uniform virtual
price (denoted ψ(qˆ)) and serves the agent with the highest virtual value strictly bigger
than ψ(qˆ) with probability one. If the probability that the largest virtual value is equal
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to ψ(qˆ) is strictly positive (which might happen if any virtual value function is constant
on an interval, e.g., from ironing), it probabilistically accepts or rejects the maximum
virtual value when it is equal to ψ(qˆ) so as to serve with the desired ex ante probability
qˆ. The optimal representative revenue can thus be calculated and bounded as follows.
Let (ψ1, . . . , ψm) denote the profile of virtual values of the representatives.
ORR(qˆ) = qˆ · ψ(qˆ) + E [maxi(ψi − ψ(qˆ))+]
≤ qˆ · ψ(qˆ) +
∑
i
E
[
(ψi − ψ(qˆ))+] .
Above, the notation (ψi − ψ(qˆ))+ is short-hand for max(0, ψi − ψ(qˆ)).
Now we show a lower bound on R˜(qˆ) for qˆ that does not require probabilistic ac-
ceptance in the optimal representative auction described above; denote by Q ⊂ [0, 1] all
such quantiles. Let Ei denote the event that ψ j < ψ(qˆ) for all j , i; our lower bound on
the pseudo qˆ-constrained lottery pricing revenue will ignore contributions to the virtual
surplus from the case that more than one representative has virtual value at least ψ(qˆ).
R˜(qˆ) ≥ qˆ · ψ(qˆ) +
∑
i
E
[
(ψi − ψ(qˆ))+ | Ei] · Pr [Ei]
≥ qˆ · ψ(qˆ) + (1 − qˆ) ·
∑
i
E
[
(ψi − ψ(qˆ))+ | Ei]
= qˆ · ψ(qˆ) + (1 − qˆ) ·
∑
i
E
[
(ψi − ψ(qˆ))+] .
The second inequality followed because Pr[Ei], the probability of the event that ψ j <
ψ(qˆ) for all j , i is not less than the probability that ψ j < ψ(qˆ) for all j, which is (1− qˆ).
To extend this lower bound on R˜(qˆ) from qˆ ∈ Q to all qˆ ∈ [0, 1], consider inserting a
virtual value ψ′ = ψ(qˆ)+ with measure zero in the distribution. The qˆ′ that corresponds
to serving this virtual value or higher has revenue bounded by the formula above but
ψ′ ≈ ψ(qˆ). Keeping the virtual value constant and varying qˆ in the formula interpolates
a line between the two revenues. As the pseudo ex ante constrained lottery pricings are
closed under convex combination, this line gives a lower bound on the pseudo qˆ-step
mechanism. Therefore, the bound above on R˜(qˆ) holds for all qˆ.
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To bound ORR(qˆ) in terms of R˜(qˆ) we consider two cases. When qˆ ≤ 1/2 these
terms can be directly bounded as the first terms in both bounds are the same and the
second terms are within a factor of two of each other (by assumption 1 − qˆ ≥ 1/2).
When qˆ ≥ 1/2 we can compare the bound on ORR(qˆ = 1) to the bound on R˜(qˆ = 1/2);
these bounds are within a factor of two of each other. Monotonicity (via downward
closure) of ORR(qˆ) and R˜(qˆ) then implies that they are within a factor of two for any
qˆ ∈ [1/2, 1]. 
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